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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to a strand of the empirical labor supply
literature by advancing our understanding of the labor supply of relatively older workers.
This is a topic of particular interest in developed countries, where due to current population
trends older individuals comprise an ever growing share of the population.
Chapter 1 provides a summary and overview of the thesis.
Chapter 2 shows that husbands and wives have an incentive to coordinate their re-
tirements due to the existence of leisure complementarities, which arise when one or both
spouses enjoy retirement more if it is shared with their partner.
Chapter 3 advances our understanding of older individuals’ incentives to continued
work by showing that, after accounting for selection into retirement and composition
effects, there is no statistical evidence that wages of individuals who remain in their career
job ever decrease with age. In other words, conditional on remaining on the career job, the
individual wage profile does not have an inverted-U shape. Any wage decreases associated
to the declining physical and cognitive abilities associated to the aging process would
materialize only at the point where the individual transits from the career job into part-
time work, usually referred to as semi-retirement. For individuals that transit directly
from the career job into full retirement, no decrease in wages would be observed.
Chapter 4 builds on the results obtained in chapters 2 and 3 to estimate the role of
leisure complementarities in determining joint retirements. If finds that they account for
8% of the joint retirements observed in the data (those where husband and wife retire
within a year of each other). This result underlines the importance of jointly modeling
the behavior of husbands and wives. Confining the analysis to the study of men while
taking the behavior of their wives as exogenous -the approach traditionally followed in
the literature-, ignores a source of simultaneity in spouses’ decisions. This may lead to
inaccurate predictions of the effect of policy changes on men’s retirement behavior.
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Chapter 1
Overview of the Thesis
1
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to a strand of the empirical labor supply
literature by advancing our understanding of the labor supply of relatively older workers.
This is a topic of particular interest in developed countries, where due to current population
trends older individuals comprise an ever growing share of the population.
As a consequence of population aging, an increasing number of individuals is drawing
retirement benefits from the public sector; and they are doing so for increasingly longer
periods of time. This has triggered concern over the future of most developed countries’
social security systems, both in terms of their sustainability and their capacity to provide
adequate coverage to a vulnerable part of the population. In order to restore financial
balance to social security programs, governments are in the process of enacting a series of
reforms, including increases in payroll contributions, delays in retirement ages, reductions
of replacement rates and cost-of-living adjustments, and incentives to private savings.
While not all of these policies are targeted to older workers, and some of them will
primarily affect the young, some others are exclusively aimed at those close to (or exactly
at) retirement age. Individuals approaching retirement age, and their labor-supply sensi-
tivity to policy changes, are the focus of this thesis. The reason I choose to focus on them,
rather than their younger counterparts, is that the knowledge we have about their labor
supply responses is relatively limited. We do know that they are different from workers in
their prime years -the labor supply elasticity of men in their 60’s, for instance, is several
times higher than that of men in their 40’s-, but there are many aspects affecting their
labor supply choice that have not been sufficiently explored.
The policy changes aimed at older workers that are currently being introduced across
OECD countries have one common objective: to give incentives for older individuals to
remain employed for longer and thus delay retirement. This is done through a combination
of policy instruments which include increases in the pension accrual rate for individuals
who remain in employment beyond normal retirement age (e.g., the rate of benefit increase
per year of work beyond normal retirement age has increased from 4.5% in 1995 to 8%
today in the US. In the UK, since 2005 individuals are allowed to defer receipt of the Basic
State Pension for as long as they wish, accruing a 10.5% increase in benefits per year of
delay.); increases in the normal retirement age, which imply higher penalties for individuals
2
who retire early (e.g., full retirement age in the US is gradually being increased from 65
years of age for individuals born in 1937 to 67 for those born after 1959. In the UK, state-
pension retirement age for women will rise from 60 to 65 years of age between 2010 and
2020); and limits on access to routes into early retirement (several OECD countries have
strengthened the requirements to qualify for a disability pension before normal retirement
age and have (partially) eliminated early-retirement pensions).
In order to design this type of policies and predict their success in changing workers’
behavior, we need measures of older workers’ labor supply sensitivity to policy changes.
These are usually obtained in the context of structural models that approximate the
process whereby workers make their participation decision. These models must accurately
measure not only the change in financial incentives associated to the policy reform, but
also all other factors affecting the labor supply choice: how much individuals value leisure;
the accrual rules of any private pension the worker may have; the wage individuals would
receive were they to remain in the labor force; the ability of employers to oblige workers
to retire, even if the individual would have found it optimal to remain employed; etc.
This thesis contributes to the literature that seeks to estimate the labor supply response
of older individuals to policy changes in two respects. First, it shows the importance of
jointly modeling the behavior of husbands and wives. Confining the analysis to the study of
men, taking the behavior of their wives as exogenous -the approach traditionally followed
in the literature- leads to biased estimates of preference parameters, and therefore incorrect
predictions of the effect of policy changes. Second, it advances our understanding of the
environment in which older individuals make decisions by showing that, after accounting
for selection into retirement and composition effects, there is no statistical evidence that
wages of individuals who remain in their career job ever decrease with age. In other words,
conditional on remaining on the career job, the individual wage profile does not have an
inverted-U shape. Any wage decreases associated to the declining physical and cognitive
abilities associated to the aging process would materialize only at the point where the
individual transits from the career job into part-time work, usually referred to as semi-
retirement. For individuals that transit directly from the career job into full retirement,
no decrease in wages would be observed.
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The two contributions of the thesis just outlined, and how they are integrated in the
structural model of labor supply and saving behavior of older couples estimated in the
fourth and last chapter, are discussed in more detail below.
The second chapter of the thesis provides evidence of a tendency of spouses to retire
together that cannot be explained by financial incentives or correlated unobservables alone.
It shows that this tendency is consistent with the existence of interactions in the preferences
of husbands and wives, stemming from one -or both- of the spouses deriving additional
utility from their own retirement whenever their partner is retired too. Whether this
type of interactions -often referred to as “complementarities in leisure”- exist is a crucial
question, since through the link they create between one spouse’s utility and their partner’s
work status they lead to simultaneity in the spouses’ choice of their optimal retirement
dates. In the presence of leisure complementarities, estimating a model of older men’s
retirement behavior which takes their wives’ income and retirement decision as exogenous
would lead to biased estimates of their preference parameters.
The chapter finds evidence consistent with leisure complementarities in a reduced-form
framework, avoiding the functional-form assumptions implicit in structural models. This
evidence is then used as a motivation for the fourth chapter, where a structural model of
couples’ labor supply which allows for complementarities in leisure is estimated.
The strategy to test for the existence of leisure complementarities is to assess whether
men respond to the (exogenous) incentives to retirement that their wife gets from the
Social Security system. In particular, the UK Social Security system gives incentives for
women to retire exactly at the state retirement age of 60. Given that a pension cannot
be claimed before that age, and that the incentives to continued work after 60 in terms
of pension accrual were very limited for women in our sample, a majority of women in
the UK actually retires at 60. The US Social Security system, on the other hand, does
not give women any incentive to retire until age 62, and the data show that a majority of
American women indeed retire at this age. Using American couples as a control group for
those in the UK, we compare the likelihood that a man retires when his wife reaches age 60
across the two countries. We find that men in the UK over the age of 60 are considerably
more likely to retire at this point than comparable American men.
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Our identification strategy is arguably superior to the one previously considered in
the literature, namely measuring whether men’s retirement decisions were affected by
their wives’ financial incentives to retirement (proxied by measures of accrued pension
wealth). The most obvious weakness of this strategy is that the wife’s accrued pension
is very unlikely to be exogenous to the husband’s retirement decision: if men with a
preference for early retirement are married to similar women, and both of them have tried
to accumulate sufficient pension wealth to finance an early exit from the work force, we
would expect to find a positive relation between men’s probability of retirement and their
wives’ accumulated pension.
Through the use of an exogenous measure of the wife’s incentives we avoid this potential
endogeneity problem. In particular, we argue that the husband’s sensitivity to his wife’s
age cannot be due to a correlation in unobservables -in the absence of an income effect, a
husband whose aim is to retire as soon as possible has no reason to respond to his wife’s
reaching age 60.
Therefore, we conclude that among the possible explanations that have been proposed
in the literature for the prevalence of observed joint retirements (i.e. those where the
spouses retire within a year of each other, independently of the age difference between
them), our findings are only consistent with the existence of complementarities in leisure.
The third chapter of the thesis estimates the (hourly) wage processes of older men,
which is then used as an input for the structural model in chapter 4. Most studies of
wage processes have focused on workers in the middle of their careers. Results from these
studies cannot necessarily be extrapolated to workers approaching retirement, as there are
several reasons why the wage processes of older workers may be different.
First, it is likely that the returns to experience or tenure will be smaller for workers
approaching the end of their careers. Moreover, they are more likely to be affected by the
physical and cognitive declines associated to the aging process. As a consequence, while
the wages of young workers are generally presumed to increase with age, it is not clear
what shape we should expect for the wage-age profile of older individuals.
The empirical question of whether wages of older workers increase or decrease with age
is of crucial importance for predicting the effects of Social Security reforms. Intuitively,
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the effectiveness of policies intended to delay average retirement age will be lower the
lower the slope of wages with respect to age -in other words, if older workers expect
diminishing returns to employment, higher rewards for delayed retirement or penalties for
early retirement will be needed to entice them to continue working.
The existing literature that has looked at this issue has found evidence of wage de-
creases when individuals reach the ages at which they can start drawing Social Security
benefits. It is known, however, that individuals who continue working after these ages are
much more likely to be semi-retired -usually working part-time- than younger ones. This
suggests that part of the decrease in wages happens at the point where individuals leave
their career job, but leaves open the question of whether the wage declines had started
before, while individuals were employed full-time. In my analysis I address this question
by focusing on the wage-age profile of individuals who remain in the career job.
From a methodological perspective, the analysis of the wage processes of older workers
requires particular focus on the process of selection into retirement, which turns out to
play a crucial role in explaining the downward-sloping wage-age profiles for older workers
observed in cross-sections.
After controlling for selection and composition effects, I find no statistical evidence of
a decrease in hourly wage rates for workers who remain in their career job, which implies
that any wage decrease to accommodate the potentially decreasing productivity of older
workers must be fully realized at the time of the switch into partial retirement.
The fourth chapter of the thesis presents a structural, dynamic model of couples’ work
and saving decisions that builds heavily on the results of chapters 2 and 3. The evidence of
the existence of complementarities in leisure presented in chapter 2 informs the structure
of this model, where the period utilities of both spouses are allowed to depend on the
partner’s participation status. While the reduced-form analysis in chapter 2 was adequate
to test for the existence of leisure complementarities, the structural model allows to obtain
a quantitative assessment of their role in explaining joint retirement.
In order to adequately measure the role of leisure complementarities in determining
optimal retirement timing for spouses, it is necessary to control for the other main deter-
minants of spouses choices. Previous structural models of retirement that have estimated
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the effects of leisure complementarities have made strong simplifying assumptions about
the financial and stochastic environment in which agents make decisions. In particular,
they have assumed perfect markets and ruled out uncertainty, effectively implying that it
was possible to determine the optimal retirement choice of a couple by simply observing
their state variables on the first period they appear in the sample. While this considerably
simplified the solution of the model, it also meant that any deviation from such retire-
ment age due to the realization of a shock or the effect of liquidity constraints would be
attributed to the effect of complementarities.
So as to to minimize this issue, the model presented in chapter 4 is rich enough to
account for the main financial incentives and sources of uncertainty for the couples in the
estimation sample. It includes a detailed specification of the Social Security rules, allows
for limited borrowing, and accounts for uncertainty in future wage income, out-of-pocket
medical expenditures, health, and survival.
The model captures couples’ heterogeneity in the main observable variables associated
to the retirement decision, that is, household wealth and spouses’ wages, pension claims,
and health status. The source of unobserved heterogeneity considered is the persistent
component of wage offers, which is estimated from the data. Each spouse’s preferences
are represented by their own utility function, and the substitutability between consumption
and leisure is not constrained to being equal for husband and wife.
The model is estimated using a subsample of older individuals from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) in two steps. The first step involves the estimation of the pa-
rameters of the laws of motion of the state variables which can be identified without
explicit reference to the model. This includes the parameters of the wage, medical costs,
health and survival processes. The estimation of the wage process is a crucial input to
the second-stage estimation, since it not only determines part of the environment in which
individuals make decisions -as mentioned above, it is important to distinguish whether
individuals who remain in full-time employment should expect increasing or decreasing
wages-; but it also yields the estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity component. The
methodology followed to perform this estimation is that described in chapter 3.
The second step of the estimation process concerns the preference parameters and the
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parameters measuring the wage depreciation following the switch from full-time into part-
time employment. These parameters are estimated within model, taking as given those
estimates obtained in the first step.
The results show that leisure complementarities are positive and significant, and ac-
count for up to 8 percent of observed joint retirements. To put this result in perspective,
the model is also used to predict the effect that the elimination of the spousal benefit
-which allows wives (the majority of spousal benefit recipients are women) to claim a So-
cial Security pension based on the contributions of their husband- would have on optimal
retirements. The simulations imply that the spousal benefit accounts for 13 percent of the
observed joint retirements.
Since neither the incentives for joint retirement provided by leisure complementarities
nor those given by the spousal benefit can be captured in a model that takes one spouse’s
behavior as exogenous, the results suggest that individual models of retirement are not
an appropriate approximation of the average household’s behavior, given the increasing
number of couples approaching retirement age where both husband and wife are working.
As a final remark, the reader must be warned that the different chapters of the thesis
were written as separate papers, which may lead to certain amounts of overlap across
chapters. It is hoped that this nuisance is offset by the resulting advantage that chapters
can be read independently.
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Chapter 2
The dynamics of retirement
behaviour in couples:
Reduced-form evidence from
England and the US
Joint with James Banks and Richard Blundell
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2.1 Introduction
Labor market participation of older individuals is nowadays a major policy issue. In the
current context of an ageing population, most countries in the developed world are intro-
ducing policy changes to encourage the delay of retirement, such as increasing retirement
ages or restricting access to non-standard routes out of the labor force. The large liter-
ature analyzing the effects of Social Security and pensions on individual behavior is now
more relevant than ever.
Many studies in this literature have looked at individual retirement incentives1, but
only recently has the focus began to switch towards retirement behavior of couples2.
However, given that the typical worker approaching retirement age is married, it is crucial
to be aware of potential interactions between spouses.
Evidence of joint retirement, defined as the coincidence in time of spouses’ retirement
dates, has been found in data from very different sources, including the New Beneficiary
Survey (Hurd (1990a)), The National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (Gustman
and Steinmeier (2000)), the Retirement History Study (Blau (1998)), and the Health and
Retirement Study (Michaud (2003)). Different mechanisms may be at play in driving joint
retirement outcomes in couples: financial incentives, willingness to spend time together
after retirement, common shocks, caring needs of one spouse, children or grandchildren,
etc. These can be broadly classified in four categories: sorting of spouses according to
their tastes for leisure; correlation in observable variables such as assets, wages, pension in-
centives, health status, etc.; correlation in time-varying shocks; and interactions in leisure,
so that spouses enjoy their own retirement more if their partner is retired as well.
Understanding the reasons underlying joint retirements is important for policy analysis.
In particular, the presence of spillovers in spouses’ decisions would imply that policies
aimed at the individual level can potentially impact the behavior of both partners. In
the UK, the state retirement age for women, which is currently 60 years of age, is set to
increase by six months per year from 2010 until it reaches 65 in 2020. This is expected to
1See Hurd(1990b), Stock and Wise (1990), Blau (1994), Diamond and Gruber (1999), Rust and Phelan
(1997), French (2005).
2See Gustman and Steinmeier(2000), Blau and Gilleskie (2006), Coile (2004a, 2004b), Michaud (2003),
Michaud and Vermeulen (2004).
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affect women’s retirement patterns. Given the incidence of joint retirement in the UK3,
which we document in the chapter, the question is whether this type of policy will change
men’s retirement patterns as well.
In this chapter we use the exogenous variation in institutional incentives to retirement
between the US and the UK to analyze the effect on husbands’ participation of their
wife’s retirement. Using working American couples as a control group for British ones, we
are able to identify significant responses of British husbands to their wives’ (exogenous)
retirement incentives. Moreover, we show that the husband’s retirement is directly linked
to the actual realization of the wife’s transition, using institutional incentives to instrument
the latter.
Our results provide evidence of the existence of spillovers in spouses’ retirement deci-
sions. We attribute those to complementarities in leisure, whereby husbands value retire-
ment more when their wife is retired as well. This raises the value of their leisure when
their wife retires, creating a link between husbands’ retirement transitions and wives’ re-
tirement incentives. We do not exclude the presence of further mechanisms leading to a
correlation in spouses’ outcomes, but none of those can explain our results in the absence
of complementarities in leisure.
Our results imply have important implications for policy analysis. Since the wife’s
participation status enters the husband utility function, their participation decisions will
be taken simultaneously. Analyses of men’s retirement outcomes that ignore the wife’s
retirement decision will yield innacurate policy predictions.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature
on joint retirement and discusses our identification strategy. Section 2.3 describes the
institutional settings in the US and the UK. Section 2.4 describes the data and observed
retirement patterns for individuals and couples in the two countries. Section 2.5 outlines
the empirical strategy. The results are presented in section 2.6, and section 2.7 concludes.
3The institutional setting we describe in the paper is common to all the UK. For simplicity we will refer
to the UK when talking about the data too, even though ELSA only surveys English households.
11
2.2 Overview
There is a growing literature on couples’ retirement choices that has analyzed the de-
terminants of joint retirement. A strand of this literature has estimated the extent of
leisure complementarities within structural models of family retirement (Maestas (2001),
Gustman and Steinmeier (2004), Casanova (2010)). These papers find that leisure com-
plementarities are a key source of spillovers in spouses’ retirement decisions, although
they differ in their conclusions regarding the relative magnitude of leisure interactions and
financial incentives. Regarding the role of unobserved tastes for leisure, Gustman and
Steinmeier (2004) find that they are an important determinant of individual retirement
decisions, but not of joint retirements.
The advantages of estimating structural models are clear when the objective is to re-
cover utility parameters. However, they also have drawbacks. Structural models require a
full parameterizations of individual preferences and stochastic processes, including distri-
butional assumptions about structural errors. Moreover, these models must be sufficiently
rich to capture the different sources of incentives to retirement (from the institutional
setting, private and public pensions, etc.). Failure to properly capture any of them may
lead to over or underestimation of the role of leisure interactions -Casanova (2010) argues
that simplifying assumptions regarding the financial and stochastic environment in which
couples make decisions lead Maestas (2001) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) to over-
state the role of leisure complementarities relative to the incentives for joint retirement
provided by the Social Security system.
A complementary approach is the estimation of reduced-form models of the effect of
one spouse’s retirement incentives on their partner’s participation. This approach does
not require distributional assumptions, but relies on the exogeneity of the measure of
retirement incentives. Early studies4 in this literature regressed indicators of the wife’s
participation on the husband’s retirement status. It is difficult to argue that this identifies
a causal effect, as the husband’s decision is unlikely to be exogenous -on the one hand,
both spouses’ participation decisions are linked through the shared budget constraint.
Moreover, in the presence of leisure interactions, each spouses’ utility depends on their
4See Coile (2004a) for a review.
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partner’s retirement status.
Coile (2004b) addresses these endogeneity concerns in her analysis of how husbands and
wives respond to their partner’s retirement incentives. She finds modest but significant
responses of husbands to different measures of their wives’ Social Security and private
pension accrual. In particular, her results show that the stronger the financial incentive
for a wife to delay retirement, the less likely her husband is to retire. She interprets this as
evidence of complementarities in leisure: the value of leisure is diminished for a husband
whose wife remains employed, which makes him more likely to remain employed himself.
The identifying assumption in Coile (2004b) is the exogeneity of pension accruals. In
particular, these must be exogenous to individual tastes for retirement. Part of the hetero-
geneity in accruals is determined by Social Security parameters such as retirement ages,
percentage benefit increases after early retirement age, the number of years of earnings
used in the computation of benefits, etc. These are clearly exogenous from the individual’s
perspective. On the other hand, there is some scope for forward-looking individuals to
time their accrual according to their taste for early retirement. A man who intends to
retire early may choose an employer providing a defined-benefit pension which allows him
to draw benefits at age 55. A woman who wants to accumulate 35 years of earnings5
before, say, age 62, may go back to work sooner after taking time off to raise her kids
than a woman who intends to work until age 65. To the extent that these mechanisms
are important, and given the correlation in spouses’ tastes for early retirement (Gustman
and Steinmeier (2004)), they could explain part of husbands’ responses to their wive’s
accruals.
2.2.1 Identification Strategy
In this paper we use an alternative measure of retirement incentives, namely the age of
entitlement to a public pension, which we refer to as the retirement age. Since this is an
institutional feature it is not correlated with couples’ tastes for retirement. We first show
that reaching retirement age is a strong predictor of wives’ retirements. Then we exploit
5Social Security pension accruals tend to flatten out after 35 years of work, because only the 35 highest
years of earnings are used in the computation of benefits. Additional years of work after that only increase
AIME (the earnings measure used to determine monthly benefits) if they replace a an earlier lower earnings
year. See description of Social Security benefits below for further details.
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the different institutional environments in the UK and US, where women reach retirement
age at 60 and 62, respectively, to test whether men respond to their wives’ retirement
incentives. We find that British men are significantly more likely to retire when their wife
becomes 60 than their American counterparts.
We attribute the difference to complementarities in leisure: British wives are more
likely to retire at age 60 than American wives. This raises the value of retirement for
British husbands with respect to American husbands, and explains why the former are
more likely to retire at this point. A threat to our identification strategy would be the
presence of spurious incentives to retirement for British husbands that kick in when their
wife becomes 60, even if she does not stop working. We explore this possibility by running
IV regressions of husbands’ transitions on those of their wives, using the retirement ages
in each county as instruments, which confirm our previous results.
In order to illustrate how our identification strategy allows us to tease out the effect
of complementarities, it is important to consider all potential sources of interactions in
spouses retirement decisions, and how they affect couples’ choices, not only upon reaching
retirement age but during their whole working lives. This is key, since forward-looking
individuals will be aware of the retirement age for public pensions from the start of their
careers, and plan accordingly.
The first channel that may lead to a link in spouses’ retirement dates is a correlation in
their tastes for leisure and, in particular, their willingness to retire early. Our measure of
retirement incentives, however, is common to all workers, and thus exogenous to couples’
tastes within each country. A concern would be that tastes for work are different in the UK
and the US. We control for this in the empirical analysis of men’s retirement transitions
by interacting age dummies with a country indicator, allowing for different propensities
to retire at every age in the two countries.
The second channel linking spouses’ choices is the shared budget constraint. If insti-
tutional incentives lead British wives to retire earlier, they will have to finance retirement
for a longer period. British couples may respond by accumulating more wealth during
their working years -they may do so by reducing consumption or working longer hours.
This type of anticipatory responses would allow them to smooth out consumption, and
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therefore rule out an income effect at the time of retirement. Our analysis does not exclude
this type of responses, but focuses only on the employment response of the husband when
his wife turns 60. Our maintained assumption is that, in the absence of leisure comple-
mentarities, the need to provide for a longer retirement for British wives would not make
their husbands more likely to retire at the exact point when they reach retirement age.
It is also possible that some couples reach retirement age with insufficient savings to
smooth out the drop in income brought about by the wife’s retirement. This cannot,
though, explain our results. A negative income effect would give husbands incentives to
increase, rather than decrease, their labor supply upon their wife’s retirement.
The final channel leading to correlations in spouses retirements is complementarity in
leisure, whereby the husband enjoys retirement more when his wife is also retired.6 Leisure
complementarities increase the value of leisure for husbands upon their wife’s retirement,
and in turn make them more likely to retire themselves.
We have argued so far that in the absence of leisure complementarities British men
should not have stronger incentives to retire when their wife reaches retirement age at
60 than American men, after controlling for their own age-specific retirement incentives.
Hence we propose the comparison of retirement propensities in the two countries at the
point when wives turn 60 as a test for the presence of leisure complementarities.
2.3 Financial Incentives for Retirement in the US and UK
In this section, we describe the main financial incentives for retirement facing individuals
in the US and the UK. Since the focus of our empirical analysis are husbands’ labor
supply responses when their wife becomes entitled to a public pension for the first time,
we focus on the rules governing Social Security pension entitlement in the two countries.
In particular, we illustrate how these may give UK women incentives to retire at a different
age from US women. Then, we consider other sources of financial incentives to retirement,
and how they may influence our results.
6Our analysis can only identify one-sided complementarities. Coile (2004b) and Gustman and Stein-
meier (2004) find that the evidence that women’s enjoyment of retirement increases when their husband
is also retired is rather weak.
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2.3.1 Social Security Benefits in the US
Old-Age, Survivors Insurance
The Old-Age, Survivors Insurance (OASI) programme provides benefits for qualified
retired workers (those who have worked for a minimum of 40 quarter in covered employ-
ment) and their dependants.
The level of individual benefits is determined from a worker’s lifetime earnings in sev-
eral steps. First, the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) is computed as a weighted
average of the worker’s earnings in covered employment. The weights are obtained from a
national wage index. Only the highest 35 years of earnings are used in this computation.
On a second step, a three-piece linear formula is used to convert AIME into the primary
insurance amount (PIA). The formula is weighed in favor of relatively low earners, so that
the replacement rate falls with as the level of earnings rises. The final step is to adjust
the PIA based on the age at which benefits are first claimed.
Individuals receive their full PIA if they retire at full retirement age (FRA). The
FRA for people born before January 1938 is 65. For people born between 1938 and
1943, the FRA increased at the rate of 2 months per year, and further increases are
scheduled for people born after 1954. The earliest age at which a worker can claim Social
Security benefits (early retirement age or ERA) has remained constant at 62 throughout.
Workers who start receiving benefits between ERA and FRA have their benefits reduced
in proportion to the number of months they retire early. For workers born after 1943, the
rate of increase is equivalent to 6.7% per year between 63 and 65 and 5% per year from 62
to 63. On the other hand, workers who postpone their retirement beyond FRA obtain an
increase in benefits for every month of nonpayment up to age 70. For workers born after
1943, the rate of increase is equivalent to 8% per year of delay.
While it is possible to claim social security benefits as early as age 62 independently
of labor force status, beneficiaries below FRA are subject to the annual earnings test,
whereby their benefits are withheld at a rate of $1 for every $2 of earnings above a
threshold. Earnings lost through the earnings test translate into higher benefits in the
future. For the workers born after 1943, the increase would be equivalent to 8% per year
of benefits lost.
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An important benefit provision affecting couples is the so-called dependent spouse ben-
efit. Spouses of social security beneficiaries can receive benefits equal to up to half of their
spouse’s full retirement pension, provided that this is higher than their own entitlement.
According to the Social Security Administration7, the proportion of women aged 62 or
older in 2004 who received benefits as dependants (that is, those who did not qualify for
retirement benefits on their own record, and received benefits on the basis of their hus-
band’s earnings record only) was 32%. The proportion with dual entitlement (those who
received benefits on the basis of both their own and their husbands’ entitlement) was 28%.
The remaining 40% was receiving benefits based on their own entitlement only.
Widows and widowers are entitled to survivors benefits, which are based on the de-
ceased spouse’s earnings record. They are eligible for full benefits at full retirement age,
or reduced benefits from age 60.
Social security benefits are annually adjusted for increases in the consumer price index
(CPI).
2.3.2 Public Pension Benefits in the UK
Basic State Pension
Unlike the US Social Security pension, the basic state pension (BSP) does not depend
on a worker’s past earnings, but only on the length of contribution to the system. In this
sense, this portion of the UK public pension system should be viewed as a minimum pen-
sion, as the one provided in the US by the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
Unlike the SSI, however, the BSP is not means-tested, and is paid to all workers that fulfill
the criteria described below.
In order to qualify for the full BSP, individuals need to have paid National Insurance
contributions (NIC) for 90% of the period between age 16 and the year before pension
age. Those with less years of contributions qualify for a proportion of the BSP, subject to
this being higher than 25%. Individuals qualify to receive the BSP at the state pension
age, which at present is 60 for women and 65 for men8.
7Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2005. Social Security Administration. SSA Publication
No. 13-11785. September 2005.
8The retirement age for women is set to increase by six months per year from 2010 until it reaches 65
in 2020.
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Until 2005, individuals could choose to defer receipt of the BSP for a maximum of five
years. For each year of delay they received approximately 7.5% extra BSP. From 2005,
individuals can defer their pension for as long as they like. If they put off claiming for at
least one year, they can choose one of two options when they do finally claim: either to
earn extra state pension at a rate equivalent to 10.5% per year of deferral; or to earn a
one-off taxable lump-sum payment based on the amount of BSP they would have received
during the deferral period, plus interest.
Recipients of BSP who are married to a partner over the state retirement age receive a
dependant’s addition to their BSP, unless their partner qualifies for a larger pension based
on their own contribution record. Many married women do not qualify for a BSP on their
own right, since those who were married before April 1977 could choose to opt out of the
system and pay reduced-rate NICs in return for a BSP equal to 60% of their husband’s
entitlement.
Widows and widowers can inherit their deceased partner’s pension entitlement in full
if it is higher than their own.
The BSP is linked to inflation since 1981. In the year 2005, the value of the BSP was
just under 15% of average earnings.
Earnings-Related State Pension
The second tier of the UK public pension system is an earnings-related pension. Even
though the regimes legislating this tier of the system have changed over the years, the
pension arrangement in place during most of the working lives of individuals in our sample
was the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). The SERPS was introduced to
provide additional retirement income to around half of the workforce, whose employers did
not provide an occupational pension scheme. In order to avoid crowding out of existing
private pension schemes, from the time of its introduction individuals were allowed to opt
out of SERPS into an employer-provided, defined benefit pension scheme. In return, both
their and their employer’s contributions were reduced. As from 1988, individuals could
also opt out of SERPS into a defined contribution pension scheme, in return for which a
proportion of their NICs were paid into the individual’s pension fund.
Because of the opt-out provisions, the proportion of retirees covered by SERPS is much
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lower than that entitled to a Social Security pension in the US.
The benefit level under SERPS was based on a worker’s NICs and level of earnings
above a threshold. Workers qualified for SERPS at the same age age BSP. Once in
payment, SERPS was indexed to inflation.
Initially, surviving partners could inherit the full amount of their spouse’s SERPS
entitlement. Since 2002, however, changes are being phased in that will make the maximum
inheritable amount equal to 50% in 2012.
Since 2002 SERPS has been replaced for new contributors by the State Second Pension
(S2P). This is a reformed version of SERPS which provides more generous additional state
pension for low and moderate earnings.
2.3.3 Other Financial Incentives for Retirement
Means-Tested Public Benefits
In the US, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programme provides income sup-
port to individuals aged 65 or older, as well as the blind or disabled.
The level of SSI entitlement is unrelated to previous work earnings, and it is based on
the individual or couple’s income. The federal benefit rate in 2005 was $579 per month
for individuals and $869 per month for couples. These quantities are offset against income
above a certain threshold. Furthermore, individuals are generally not eligible for SSI if
they have net worth exceeding $2,000 (or $3,000 for couples).
In 2004, just over a million individuals qualified for age-related SSI payments.
In the UK, the Pension Credit (PC) was introduced in 2003 to provide income support
to those at or approaching retirement age. The pension credit has two components, the
guarantee credit and the savings credit.
The guarantee credit aims to bridge the gap between individuals or couples’ income and
a specified minimum level called the ’appropriate amount’ (£167.05 per week for couples
in 2005). A single person must be 60 or over to qualify for guarantee credit. Couples
qualify when the oldest spouse reaches 60.
As can be seen in figure 2.1, individuals qualifying for the guarantee credit face a
100% marginal withdrawal rate whenever their total income is lower than the minimum
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level. The savings credit, which becomes available when a single individual or the oldest
spouse in a couple turns 65, attempts to reduce this disincentive to save by cutting the
marginal withdrawal rate. Guarantee credit beneficiaries with income between a minimum
threshold (£131.20 per week for couples in 2005) and the appropriate amount receive a
saving credit equal to 60% of their income above the threshold. The third series of figure
2.1 shows the effect of the savings credit.
Figure 2.1: Effect of PC when oldest spouse is aged 65 or over
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Private Pensions
It is well known that private pensions play an important role in determining retire-
ment decisions9. In particular, defined benefit (DB) schemes offer strong incentives for
retirement at certain ages through provisions such as the early and normal retirement
ages.
On the surface, the expansions of private pensions in the US and the UK seem to
follow some common trends. In particular, both countries have seen a switch from DB to
defined contribution (DC) pensions in recent times. To our knowledge, however, there are
no studies describing how private pension provisions -such as the distribution of normal
retirement ages, relationship between early retirement ages and premium, etc.- may differ
across the two countries. In the remaining of the chapter we implicitly assume that incen-
9Gustman and Steinmeier (1989), Gustman and Mitchell (1992), Stock and Wise (1990), French(2005)
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tives from private pensions have no significantly different age-effects on the two countries,
and that this is particularly true at the ages in which we focus our analysis, namely 60
and 62.
Health Insurance
In the US, the health insurance programme Medicare covers most people who are either
65 or meet a series of special criteria, such as being disabled. The programme has four
different parts, which cover different aspects of health care costs. Some of these are only
available to individuals who pay a monthly fee.
Spouses of Medicare recipients who are not disabled do not become entitled to Medicare
benefits until they reach 65.
Medicaid is another US state-run programme that provides hospital and medical cover-
age for people with low income and little or no resources. The rules for Medicaid eligibility
and coverage vary across states.
In the UK, health care is universal and free at all ages, and private provision is relatively
rare. Therefore, there are no age-specific incentives to retire or stay in work related to
health insurance.
Different studies have discussed how Medicare eligibility affects retirement decisions
of individuals and their spouses in the US (Rust and Phelan (1997), Blau and Gilleskie
(2006), French and Jones (2007)). Given that most health insurance before age 65 is
provided by employers, these studies suggest that individuals whose employer-provided
health insurance does not cover retirees may find strong incentives to remain in work
until age 65. On the other hand, Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1996) find that Medicare
eligibility has little effect on retirement age. In the empirical analysis we do not specifically
control for health insurance, but we think it is unlikely to have important effects in our
results. Even in the presence of a health-insurance type of effect, the subsample of affected
individuals would be relatively small. According to the HRS data, only around 9% of men
and 8% of women from the initial cohort report having an insurance which they could not
keep if they retired. It is conceivable that the fraction of these individuals in the sample of
workers increases as they approach age 65, but our main interest is in retirement behavior
at age 60, when the majority of both men and women are still in the labor force.
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Disability Insurance
Disability benefits can provide important labor supply disincentives10. In particular,
disability insurance is sometimes viewed as a path towards early retirement. Take-up of
disability benefits has risen rapidly in recent years both in the US and the UK.
Given the difficulty in exactly quantifying the age structure of the disincentive to work
these benefits provide, we opt once again for not including any specific controls in the
empirical analysis.
2.3.4 Potential Interactions Among Incentives to Retirement
Table 2.1 summarizes the age-structure of incentives for retirement in the US and UK from
public pensions, means-tested public benefits and state-provided health insurance. Private
pensions and disability benefits are not included in table 2.1. For the latter, even though
coverage increases with age -as does ill health-, we cannot identify jumps in entitlement
at particular ages. The former do give strong incentives to retire at early retirement ages
-particularly DB pensions-, but both these ages and the strength of the incentives vary
wildly across plans in the two countries.
2.3.5 Sources of Elderly Couples’ Income
Our identification strategy will exploit the difference in retirement ages in the US and
the UK. British women reach state pension age at 60, whereas American women cannot
claim a Social Security pension before age 62. The power of our instrument will depend on
how strongly women respond to the incentives provided by the system, and in particular
whether they tend to retire upon reaching retirement age. Since this will be partly deter-
mined by the importance of Social Security income as a proportion of household income
in the two countries, we analyze these below.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the relative importance of different sources of income for
households in the US and the UK where the husband is past normal retirement age.
Households are divided by country-specific income quintiles. The different sources of
10See Bound and Burkhauser (1999), Benitez-Silva et al. (1999), Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust
(2004).
22
Table 2.1: Age structure of incentives to retirement. US and UK.
US UK
Husband’s age
60 Guarantee Credit
(if husband is older)
62 Early Retirement
Social Security Benefit
65 Normal Retirement Basic and Earnings-Related
Social Security Benefit∗ State Pensions
Supplemental Security Savings Credit
Income (if husband is older)
Medicare
Wife’s age
60 Basic and Earnings-Related
State Pensions
Guarantee Credit
(if wife is older)
62 Early Retirement
Social Security Benefit∗
65 Normal Retirement Savings Credit
Social Security Benefit (if wife is older)
Supplemental Security
Income
Medicare
∗ Normal retirement age will be higher than 65 years of age for individuals reaching age 62 later
than the year 2000.
income considered are Social Security pensions, private pensions, income from work and
income from all other sources, including disability pensions and health insurance payments.
The general trends are common for the two countries: The proportion of income from
social security decreases as family income increases, whereas the proportion of income
from private pensions, work and all other sources increases.
An important difference between the graphs is the proportion of income from employ-
ment, which is higher in the US for all income quintiles. The proportion of income from
private pensions is generally higher in the UK. This is because 55% of workers in the UK11
opt out of the earnings-related part of the public pension system, and instead contribute
11Data for years 2001/02. Source: Department of Work and Pensions. “Second Tier Pension Provision
1978/79 to 2003/04”. UK.
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Figure 2.2: Sources of household income by income quintile. HRS. Year 2002.
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NOTE. - Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2002 HRS wave. Sample includes couples where the husband is 66 to 70.
Figure 2.3: Sources of household income by income quintile. ELSA. Year 2002.
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NOTE. - Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2002 ELSA wave. Sample includes couples where the husband is 66 to 70.
to their employer’s occupational pension.
Regarding the relative weight of Social Security benefits in household income, we can
see that this is higher in the UK for all income groups except the lowest one. This may
seem puzzling, given that UK workers who opt out of the earnings-related public pension
only get the basic pension from the public system, and this replaces a lower percentage
of lifetime wages that the US Social Security pension for a majority of workers. However,
other factors such as the larger proportion of workers delaying Social Security receipt
beyond age 65 in the US, the larger proportion of US workers receiving income from
employment after that age, and the higher replacement rates in the UK can explain the
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higher reliance on Social Security for British workers.
The higher share of public benefits in UK households’ income should not affect the
interpretation of our empirical results. The identifying power in our analysis comes only
from the different age structure of public benefits in the US and UK, which gives rise to a
discrete jump in benefit entitlement for women in the UK, but not in the US, at age 60.
2.4 Data Description
2.4.1 Data Sources
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the US and from the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) for the UK12.
The HRS is a longitudinal study of individuals over the age of 50 and their spouses.
This US-representative survey is carried out every two years. Currently there are 7 waves
available, the first of them corresponding to the year 1992, and the last one to 2004. The
survey provides extensive information on individual sources of income, retirement plans,
health and demographics. It also provides comprehensive measures of household wealth.
ELSA samples individuals aged 50 and over residing in the household sector in the
UK at baseline, and their spouses. The study is conducted every two years. There are
currently two waves available, corresponding to the years 2002 and 2004, plus baseline
data from the Health Survey for England (HSE) from the years 1998 to 2001.
ELSA also provides comprehensive information on financial and health status of indi-
viduals, together with retirement expectations and demographics. ELSA has been devel-
oped in collaboration with the HRS, and the aim is for the income and wealth data and
many of the health questions and experimental modules to be directly comparable across
the two surveys.
The comparability of variables and their focus on individuals close to retirement age
makes these two surveys optimal candidates to be used in our empirical study. We use
data from the overlapping waves, corresponding to the years 2002 and 2004. Our core
sample is made of working couples where the husband is aged between 55 and 66. After
12The institutional description in section 2.3 is relevant for the whole of the UK. For simplicity we refer to
the UK too when describing the data, even though ELSA is only representative of the English population.
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dropping those observations where any of the spouses is not present or did not respond to
the survey in one of the two waves, we are left with 1338 such couples, 817 from HRS and
521 from ELSA.
We have tried to build a measure of participation that is as comparable as possible
across surveys. We first compute the number of hours each individual works every week.
For ELSA observations, these are obtained as the sum of the number of weekly hours
worked in the main salary job or in self employment, plus the number of monthly hours
worked in any other casual jobs divided by four. For HRS observations, weekly hours
are the sum of hours worked per week in the main and secondary job, including self-
employment.
Using this information, an individual is defined as active if they describe themselves as
working for pay and work for more than 2 hours a week13. A person is defined as making
a transition out of work between the two waves if they are active in the first wave and
inactive in the second one.
Health is measured at baseline with three dummy variables constructed from the self-
reported health question. The dummies indicate whether an individual is in very good,
good or bad health (corresponding to excellent or very good; good; and fair or poor self-
reported health, respectively). In all our regressions, the omitted category is being in good
health.
Education is also measured at baseline with three dummies. The dummy “graduate”
is equal to 1 for individuals in both countries who have at least some college education.
The dummy “high school” indicates whether US individuals are high school graduates or
equivalent and whether British individuals have at least an O level or equivalent. The
omitted category corresponds to individuals who are not high school graduates in the US
or do not have any O level or equivalent in the UK.
Throughout our analysis we allow for differential effects of the health and education
dummies in the two countries.
13We have experimented with alternative definitions of participation, coding as participants those indi-
viduals working more than 8, 10 and 15 hours per week, and do not find any qualitative impact on the
results.
26
2.4.2 Labor Force Transitions of Older Couples
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 in the appendix show employment rates for ELSA and HRS men and
women, respectively, after age 55. We use the two available observations per individual,
corresponding to the 2002 and 2004 waves, to build 1-year cohorts by age at baseline, and
follow these across the two waves. The figures show that the employment and transition
patterns in both countries are relatively similar until age 60. At this point, the first
retirement incentives take effect in the UK, and the series for the two countries start to
diverge.
The post-age 60 divergence is more evident for women, for whom the state pension
age is 60 in the UK. For men, a clear divergence takes place after 65, the state pension
age in the UK and normal retirement age in the US. Participation rates past age 65 are
much lower for men in the UK than in the US.
These two figures suggest that, until retirement incentives kick in, labor market out-
comes are similar in the two countries. This provides preliminary evidence that the US is
a proper control group for the UK.
Figure 2.9 shows labor market exits for men and women in the US as a function of age.
The series for men and women look relatively similar, which is consistent with retirement
incentives in this country being the same for all individuals. The series for men shows the
well-known spikes at 62 and 65, the early and normal retirement ages, respectively. The
series for women also shows spikes at 62 and 65, even though they are less pronounced
than for men.
Figure 2.10 shows the age pattern of labor market exits for men and women in the
UK. The two series look remarkably different. Both men and women tend to concentrate
their exits around their respective state pension ages of 65 and 60.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 indicate that both men and women follow their individual incen-
tives in planning retirement exits. There is, however, a further dimension to retirement
behavior, which is that of within-couple interactions. Individuals may take into account
their spouse’s incentives, on top of their own, when making retirement decisions. We
analyze this possibility below.
The phenomenon of joint retirement refers to the coincidence in time of spouses’ re-
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tirement, independently of the age difference between them. Several studies have studied
the prevalence of this type of joint behavior in the US. Here, we compare the evidence for
the US and the UK.
Figure 2.4: Distribution of differences in spouses’ retirement dates, by age difference between spouses. HRS.
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Our data for the baseline wave of 2002 confirm the importance of joint retirement in
both countries. Figure 2.4 analyzes the correlation in retirement dates14 for HRS couples
where both members are retired in 2002. Each graph in figure 2.4 shows the distribution of
differences in retirement dates for couples with different age differences across spouses15.
The first graph shows the distribution of retirement date differences for couples where the
husband is more than a year younger than the wife; the second graph shows the distribution
of retirement date differences for couples where the husband is exactly one year younger
than the wife; and so on. In all of the 6 graphs, the highest frequency corresponds to a
retirement date difference of zero, that is, to spouses retiring on the same calendar year.
14Retirement date difference is defined as the husband’s retirement date minus the wife’s retirement
date. Hence positive values indicate that the husband retired at a later calendar date than the wife.
15Age difference is defined as age of the husband minus age of the wife.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of differences in spouses’ retirement dates, by age difference between spouses. ELSA.
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Figure 2.5 plots differences in retirement dates for ELSA couples. Once again, with
the exception of the two first graphs -which correspond to couples where the husband is
younger, and therefore a relatively small number of observations-, the highest frequency
corresponds to spouses retiring the same year. Even in the first to graphs, the frequency
of same-date exits is among the highest.
It is interesting to note that graphs 1 to 3 in figure 2.5 show a relatively large frequency
of exits at the dates corresponding to both spouses retiring at state pension age (this would
correspond to a difference in retirement dates greater than 7 years in graph 1, equal to 6
years in graph 2 , and 5 years in graph 3). For couples where the husband is older than the
wife, which are one of the subsets that we analyze in the empirical part below, the only
remarkable peaks corresponds to both spouses retiring at the same date, independently of
their corresponding state pension ages.
These figures tell us that there is an important role to play for within-couple retirement
incentives, beyond individual ones. In the empirical part of the analysis we study the effect
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of wives’ incentives on men’s retirement behavior, after controlling for men’s individual
incentives. We do this by using working US couples as a control for working British
couples. When interpreting the results of the analysis we make the implicit assumption
that any within-couple incentives coming from complementarities in leisure are similar
across countries. This is a difficult hypothesis to test. In order to provide some support
for it, we show in figure 2.6 that the distributions of age differences within spouses in
the two countries are extremely close. This rules out differences in couples’ preferences
stemming from country-specific within-couple age patterns. We assume that any other
country-specific differences in tastes for joint leisure can be accounted for through the
individual age, health status and education controls that we include in the empirical
analysis.
Figure 2.6: Within-couple age difference distribution. Husband aged 55 to 66.
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2.5 Empirical strategy
The goal is to estimate the differential effect that having a wife who reaches age 60 has
for British men with respect to American men. We estimate regression equations of the
following form:
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Rht = α+ β0∆awt + β1∆
a
wt × ELSA+ ELSA+Xt−1θ′0 +Xt−1θ′1 × ELSA+ εht, (2.5.1)
where h denotes the husband and w the wife; Rht is a dummy variable indicating
whether the husband makes a transition out of the labor force between periods t− 1 and
t; ∆awt is a dummy variable indicating whether the wife reaches age a between t− 1 and t;
ELSA is an indicator that observation comes from the ELSA sample; and X is a vector of
observables which includes measures of the husband’s age and education and both spouses’
health status.
We also run IV regressions of the following form:
Rht = γ + δRwt + ELSA+Xt−1φ′0 +Xt−1φ
′
1 × ELSA+ uht, (2.5.2)
where the wife’s transition Rwt is instrumented with indicators of whether she has
reached retirement age, i.e. ∆awt and ∆
a
wt × ELSA for different values of a.
All regressors in equations 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 are included both on their own and interacted
with the ELSA dummy to allow for differential effects in the two countries. The regressions
are estimated as probits.
The object of interest from our regressions is the interaction effect for the indicator
that the wife crosses age 60 and the ELSA dummy. As discusses in Ai and Norton (2003),
this is not the same as the marginal effect of the interaction term. In particular, given a
regression of the type:
E[Rht | ∆60wt, ELSA] = F (α+ β0∆60wt + β1∆60wt ×ELSA+ β2ELSA), (2.5.3)
the interaction effect is defined as the following discrete double difference:
∆2E[Rht | ∆60wt, ELSA]
∆(∆60wt)∆ELSA
= (2.5.4)
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= E[Rht | ∆60wt = 1, ELSA = 1]− E[Rht | ∆60wt = 0, ELSA = 1]−
− (E[Rht | ∆60wt = 1, ELSA = 0]− E[Rht | ∆60wt = 0, ELSA = 0)
In nonlinear models, this is different from the marginal effect of the interaction, which
would be defined as:
∆E[Rht | ∆60wt, ELSA]
∆(∆60wt × ELSA)
=
= E[Rht | ∆60wt = 1, ELSA = 1]− E[Rht | ∆60wt = 0, ELSA = 0]
Equation 2.5.4 shows that the interaction effect is the difference-in-differences estimator
of the differential effect of the wife crossing 60 in the UK with respect to the US. This is
the object of interest of this paper, and the effect we report in our results.
Given that the variables ∆60wt and ELSA are dummies, 2.5.4 simplifies to:
∆2E[Rht | ∆60wt, ELSA]
∆(∆60wt)∆ELSA
=
= F (α+ β0 + β1 + β2)− F (α+ β2)− F (α+ β0) + F (α)
A further point of interest regarding marginal effects concerns the marginal effect of
non-interacted variables. From equation 2.5.3, the marginal effect of the variable ∆60wt is
defined as follows
∆E[Rht | ∆60wt, ELSA]
∆(∆60wt)
=
= E[Rht | ∆60wt = 1, ELSA]−E[Rht | ∆60wt = 0, ELSA] =
= F (α+ β0 + β1ELSA+ β2ELSA)− F (α+ β2ELSA)
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.Notice that this marginal effect cannot be interpreted as the effect on American hus-
bands of their wife reaching age 60. This is because the effect of a change in the variable
∆60wt operates through the coefficient β0 and, for observations from the ELSA sample, also
through the coefficient β1.
In some cases we will want to comment on the effect on American husbands of their
wives reaching a particular age. In those cases, we compute this effect separately according
to the following formula:
∆E[Rht | ∆62wt, ELSA = 0]
∆(∆62wt)
= (2.5.5)
= E[Rht | ∆62wt = 1, ELSA = 0]−E[Rht | ∆62wt = 0, ELSA = 0] =
= F (α+ β0)− F (α)
2.6 Estimation Results
We start by estimating equation 2.5.1 using the sample of couples where both spouses
work at baseline and the wife is younger than 60 at baseline. We exclude older wives
because in the UK most of them will have retired at age 60, and therefore the group of
working women aged 61 and older will likely oversample those with a strong taste for work.
Results for the variables of interest are presented in table 2.2 below.
Table 2.2: Effect on husbands’ transitions of wife reaching age 60.
Dependent Variable: Rht
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
∆60wt
-0.01928 0.01995 0.01699 -0.00360
(0.464) (0.606) (0.693) (0.918)
∆60wt×ELSA
0.03255 0.15438 0.13991 0.19918
(0.566) (0.041) (0.102) (0.038)
N 1,027 899 782 671
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects from probit regressions reported. Empirical p-values
(in parentheses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. Sample includes couples
where both spouses are working and wife is younger than 60 at baseline. Full set of controls includes
both spouses’ health status and husband’s age and education at baseline. See table 2.6 in appendix
1.B for full estimation results.
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As can be seen from the second column of table 2.2, the marginal effect of having a wife
who reaches age 60 is small and not significant. More importantly, the interaction effect
for the indicator that the wife crosses age 60 and the ELSA dummy is positive but small
and not significantly different from zero. As pointed out in section 2.5, the interaction
effect is the difference-in-differences estimator of the effect of having a wife reaching age
60 for a British husband, with respect to an American one. Hence British husbands do not
appear more likely to retire when their wives reach retirement age than their American
counterparts.
We hypothesize that the lack of a differential effect is driven by the behavior of very
young husbands, who are many years away from becoming entitled to their own public
pension -state pension age is 65 for British men. In the absence of a private pension with
an early retirement clause, these husbands will have strong financial incentives to continue
working. In order to check this hypothesis, we run the same regression restricting the
sample to those couples where the husband is older than the wife (that is, where the
variable “Agediff”, which is equal to husband’s age minus wife’s age, is greater than zero).
In this restricted sample, all husbands of women reaching age 60 between waves will have
reached age 60 themselves. Results are shown on the third column of table 2.2.
We can see that for the restricted sample the baseline effect of having a wife crossing age
60 is not significant, but the differential effect for British men is positive and significant.
In particular, the retirement propensity for British husbands whose wife reaches age 60 is
15 percentage points higher than for their American counterparts. Further restricting the
sample to couples where the husband is more than a year older than the wife (column 4)
yields a coefficient of similar magnitude, while in the sample of couples where the husband
is more than two years older than the wife (column 5), British husbands are 19 percentage
points more likely to retire when the wife becomes 60 than American husbands.
As argued in section 2.2, the increase in husbands’ retirement propensity when their
wife reaches retirement age cannot be explained by a correlation in tastes for retirement
or income effects, so our results are suggestive of complementarities of leisure. There is a
concern, though, that British men may have incentives to retire when their wife reaches
age 60 that are independent of whether she retires or not. To confirm that we are not
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capturing a spurious effect, and British husbands are indeed responding to their wives’
retirement, we next run IV regressions of the husband’s retirement transition indicator on
that of his wife. We instrument the wife’s transition with indicators that she has reached
age 60 or age 62, the retirement ages in the UK and the US, respectively. In order to
sample women reaching retirement age in the two countries, we use observations for all
working couples where the wife is younger than 62 at baseline. Results for the second
stage are reported in table 2.3 below.
Table 2.3: Effect of wife’s transition on husband’s transition.
Dependent Variable: Rht
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
Rst
0.11795 0.46392 0.54210 0.63521
(0.565) (0.019) (0.008) (0.035)
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects from probit regressions reported. Empirical p-values
(in parentheses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. Sample includes couples
where both spouses are working and wife is younger than 62 at baseline. Full set of controls includes
both spouses’ health status and husband’s age and education at baseline. See table 2.7 in appendix
1.B for full estimation results.
The effect of the wife’s transition on that of her husband is positive but not significant
for the full sample, as seen in column 2. As before, we next restrict the sample by dropping
those couples where the husband is furthest from his own retirement age. Column 3 shows
results for the sample of couples where the husband is older than the wife. The results
indicate that a husband whose wife retires is 46% more likely to retire himself than one
whose wife continues working. The coefficient is significant with a p-value of 0.02. For
the samples of couples where the husband is more than a year and more than two years
older than their wife, we find that the wife’s transition increases the husband’s retirement
propensity by 54 and 63%, respectively.
These results confirm that the increases in British husbands’ retirement propensities we
found in table 2.2 were triggered by their wives’ high retirement propensity upon reaching
age 60. The retirement age for women in exogenous to husbands’ taste for retirement.
Most household should be prepared to smooth out the drop in income at the time of
the wife’s retirement. For household without savings, the negative income effect would
give husbands incentives to decrease, rather than decrease their labor supply. On the
other hand, if the husband values retirement more when this is shared with his wife, upon
his wife’s retirement the value of leisure increases for him, which would in turn increase
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his retirement propensity. Thus we interpret the positive differential responses of British
husbands to their wives reaching retirement age as evidence of leisure complementarities.
2.6.1 Retirement transitions of American men
By the time women reach age 60 either in the US or the UK, most of those who were
working in their 50’s remain in the labor force. Most of their husbands are working, too.
However, by the time they reach age 62 the majority of British women will have retired.
For this reason, those British couples where both spouses are working by the time the wife
becomes 62 are likely to have a strong taste for work. Hence they may not be as good a
control group for their American counterparts at this age as American couples where for
British couples at the time when wives become 60. Keeping this caveat in mind, we turn
now to the analysis of American men’s retirement transitions when their wives reach early
retirement age at 62.
We estimate equation 2.5.1 using the sample of working couples where women are up
to 61 years at baseline, and adding as a regressor an indicator for whether the wife reaches
age 62 between waves. Results are reported in table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Effect on husbands’ transitions of wife reaching age 60 or age 62.
Dependent Variable: Rht
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
∆60wt
-0.01424 0.03032 0.02972 0.00435
(0.616) (0.452) (0.528) (0.944)
∆60wt×ELSA
0.04994 0.17656 0.15564 0.21871
(0.392) (0.024) (0.088) (0.040)
∆62wt
0.06408 0.06957 0.06816 0.09415
(0.056) (0.092) (0.124) (0.116)
∆62wt×ELSA
-0.08776 -0.13591 -0.13296 -0.11330
(0.296) (0.188) (0.236) (0.444)
N 1169 996 861 717
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects from probit regressions reported. Empirical p-values
(in parentheses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. Sample includes couples
where both spouses are working and wife is younger than 62 at baseline. Full set of controls includes
both spouses’ health status and husband’s age education at baseline. See table 2.8 in appendix 1.B
for full estimation results.
As before, we find that the differential effect of having a wife who reaches age 60
for British with respect to American husbands is small and not significant for the whole
sample, but is positive for the subsamples of couples where the husbands are at least one,
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two, or three years older than their wives. The magnitude of the effects is similar to those
reported in table 2.2, and they are significant at 5 percent for the third and fifth columns
and at 10 percent for the fourth one.
We turn now to the effect of having a wife who reaches age 62. The differential effect
for British husbands is negative for all samples, indicating that they are less likely to
retire when their wife becomes 62 than their American counterparts. This is what we
would have expected in the presence of leisure complementarities, since American women
reach retirement age at 62, while British women do not have specific incentives coming
from the public pension system to retire at that age. The coefficients, however, are not
statistically significant for any of the samples. This is likely due to the small number of
observations: since the majority of British women retire at 60, we end up with few working
British couples where the wife crosses age 62 between waves.
Beyond the interaction effect, we are also interested in the marginal effect of having a
wife crossing age 62 for American men, which we would expect to be negative if American
men are responsive to their wives’ retirement incentives. As explained in section 2.5,
the marginal effect for the indicator that the wife crosses 62, reported in table 2.4 above,
compounds the responses of American and British husbands. The marginal effect of having
a wife who reaches age 62 for American husbands, computed according to the formula
described in 2.5.5, is reported in table 2.5 for the different samples. It is always significant,
and it increases from 10 to 13 percent as we restrict the sample to exclude young husbands
who are further from their own retirement age.
Table 2.5: Marginal effect on American husbands’ transitions of wife reaching age 62.
Dependent Variable: Rht
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
∆62wt |ELSA=0
0.10129 0.12370 0.11867 0.13731
(0.028) (0.028) (0.076) (0.112)
N 1169 996 861 717
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects from probit regressions reported. Empirical p-values
(in parentheses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we use the institutional variation across the US and the UK, and in
particular the different ages of entitlement to a public pension in the two countries (60 in
the UK, 62 in the US), to analyze husbands’ responses to their wives’ retirement incentives.
We show in section 2.4 that labor market outcomes in the two countries are comparable
until the first retirement incentives for women kick in in the UK. Based on this, we use
working American couples as a control group for British ones at the point when British
women reach retirement age.
We find that, in the sample of couples where the husband is older than the wife, British
men are from 14 to 20 percentage points more likely to retire when their wife reaches state
pension age at 60 than their American counterparts.
We then use the exogenous institutional retirement ages to instrument women’s tran-
sitions in a regression of husbands’ transitions onto those of their wives. For the sample
of couples where the husband is older than the wife, we find a strong effect of the wife’s
retirement onto that of the husband.
We interpret our results as evidence of complementarity in leisure, whereby the hus-
band enjoys retirement more when his wife is retired as well. Alternative explanations for
the correlation in spouses’ retirement outcomes are not consistent with our results.
Our findings have important implications for policy analysis. They imply that the
wife’s participation status enters the husband’s utility function, and hence that the spouses’
participation choices are made simultaneously. Analyses of men’s retirement outcomes that
ignore the wife’s retirement decision will yield biased policy predictions.
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2.8 Appendix 1.A. Figures
Figure 2.7: Percentage employed by age cohort, men.
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Figure 2.8: Percentage employed by age cohort, women.
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Figure 2.9: Change in proportion working by age crossed between waves, men and women, US.
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Figure 2.10: Change in proportion working by age crossed between waves, men and women, UK.
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2.9 Appendix 1.B. Tables
Table 2.6: Probit regression of husbands’ transitions on dummies indicating whether their wives reach age 60.
Marginal effects reported. (Continued in next page).
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
∆60st -0.01928 0.01995 0.01699 -0.00360
(-0.068, 0.035) (-0.044, 0.092) (-0.052, 0.095) (-0.080, 0.086)
∆60st×ELSA 0.03255 0.15438∗ 0.13991 0.19918∗
(-0.071, 0.138) (0.013, 0.305) (-0.011, 0.299) (0.024, 0.387)
ELSA 0.07375∗ 0.08555∗∗ 0.08369∗∗ 0.10003∗∗
(0.025, 0.122) (0.032, 0.139) (0.025, 0.141) (0.038, 0.160)
Graduate 0.01335 0.01552 0.00290 -0.00832
(-0.047, 0.073) (-0.049, 0.080) (-0.066, 0.071) (-0.082, 0.063)
High School -0.00853 -0.00746 -0.03143 -0.03454
(-0.071, 0.059) (-0.074, 0.065) (-0.103, 0.047) (-0.109, 0.049)
Graduate × ELSA 0.03958 0.06598 0.04914 0.06059
(-0.076, 0.167) (-0.060, 0.205) (-0.085, 0.199) (-0.083, 0.217)
High School × ELSA 0.00052 0.01383 -0.04662 -0.07765
(-0.120, 0.132) (-0.115, 0.156) (-0.180, 0.101) (-0.218, 0.080)
Health = v good -0.07539∗∗ -0.09979∗∗ -0.09615∗∗ -0.09099∗
(-0.128, -0.026) (-0.156, -0.047) (-0.156, -0.040) (-0.155, -0.031)
Health = v good × ELSA 0.03839 0.02047 0.01713 0.00928
(-0.029, 0.116) (-0.049, 0.098) (-0.057, 0.101) (-0.069, 0.100)
Health = bad -0.02686 -0.03381 -0.09008 -0.13716∗
(-0.130, 0.080) (-0.145, 0.082) (-0.209, 0.035) (-0.265, -0.004)
Health = bad × ELSA 0.07464 0.08811 0.05184 -0.01507
(-0.076, 0.235) (-0.065, 0.255) (-0.108, 0.230) (-0.185, 0.179)
Sp heal = v good 0.00969 0.02083 0.01119 0.01327
(-0.039, 0.059) (-0.031, 0.073) (-0.045, 0.066) (-0.047, 0.072)
Sp heal = v good × ELSA 0.02885 0.04833 0.04277 0.02639
(-0.044, 0.113) (-0.035, 0.143) (-0.047, 0.148) (-0.068, 0.139)
Sp heal = bad 0.07198 0.11287 0.12144 0.09407
(-0.035, 0.176) (-0.003, 0.224) (-0.002, 0.242) (-0.038, 0.221)
Sp heal = bad × ELSA -0.01966 0.00510 -0.07950 -0.08815
(-0.178, 0.140) (-0.175, 0.188) (-0.275, 0.117) (-0.293, 0.114)
Age = 56 0.03350 0.03496 0.08870 0.12656
(-0.049, 0.125) (-0.062, 0.145) (-0.038, 0.235) (-0.035, 0.302)
Age = 57 -0.02025 -0.00323 0.04496 0.07091
(-0.100, 0.081) (-0.096, 0.113) (-0.074, 0.195) (-0.074, 0.254)
Age = 58 0.04001 0.04255 0.06684 0.10690
(-0.046, 0.143) (-0.053, 0.159) (-0.059, 0.213) (-0.048, 0.285)
Age = 59 0.05764 0.04683 0.10727 0.16462∗
(-0.036, 0.164) (-0.052, 0.162) (-0.018, 0.248) (0.008, 0.336)
Age = 60 0.08098 0.06535 0.09392 0.12468
(-0.017, 0.188) (-0.041, 0.185) (-0.037, 0.233) (-0.027, 0.288)
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects reported. Empirical confidence intervals (in paren-
theses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. ∗ indicates significance at 5%. ∗∗
indicates significance at 1%. Agediff is age difference between spouses, defined as age of the hus-
band minus age of the wife. Sample: couples where both spouses work at baseline, husband’s age
is between 55 and 66 at baseline, and wife’s age is less than 60 at baseline.
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Table 2.6: Continued from previous page.
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
Age = 61 0.07443 0.05104 0.08944 0.08395
(-0.026, 0.193) (-0.055, 0.176) (-0.035, 0.233) (-0.058, 0.252)
Age = 62 0.15326∗ 0.12719 0.17160∗ 0.21428∗
(0.023, 0.298) (-0.008, 0.279) (0.015, 0.340) (0.036, 0.398)
Age = 63 0.27529∗∗ 0.24343∗∗ 0.28872∗∗ 0.33057∗∗
(0.134, 0.421) (0.095, 0.400) (0.124, 0.458) (0.138, 0.517)
Age = 64 0.22358∗∗ 0.19892∗∗ 0.23937∗∗ 0.27227∗∗
(0.083, 0.366) (0.052, 0.352) (0.079, 0.407) (0.088, 0.464)
Age = 65 0.34829∗∗ 0.31016∗ 0.34615∗∗ 0.40626∗
(0.132, 0.532) (0.096, 0.505) (0.141, 0.539) (0.179, 0.613)
Age = 66 0.19855∗ 0.13796 0.17930∗ 0.19946
(0.010, 0.421) (-0.047, 0.379) (-0.021, 0.430) (-0.026, 0.467)
Age = 56 × ELSA -0.00953 -0.07042 -0.01961 -0.16035
(-0.188, 0.161) (-0.285, 0.129) (-0.299, 0.235) (-0.486, 0.143)
Age = 57 × ELSA -0.00089 0.00314 0.03811 -0.00841
(-0.180, 0.186) (-0.212, 0.217) (-0.237, 0.319) (-0.344, 0.307)
Age = 58 × ELSA 0.14590 0.18135 0.12182 0.00701
(-0.047, 0.341) (-0.042, 0.400) (-0.161, 0.399) (-0.324, 0.328)
Age = 59 × ELSA 0.06885 0.08605 0.11608 -0.01867
(-0.144, 0.274) (-0.150, 0.308) (-0.169, 0.385) (-0.352, 0.298)
Age = 60 × ELSA 0.03276 -0.01451 0.01032 -0.02594
(-0.179, 0.252) (-0.237, 0.220) (-0.261, 0.282) (-0.340, 0.278)
Age = 61 × ELSA 0.13604 0.08074 0.11707 -0.03075
(-0.078, 0.373) (-0.142, 0.330) (-0.150, 0.401) (-0.332, 0.296)
Age = 62 × ELSA 0.18359 0.12815 0.16345 0.00252
(-0.111, 0.476) (-0.179, 0.431) (-0.178, 0.485) (-0.358, 0.353)
Age = 63 × ELSA 0.34634∗ 0.27769 0.30185 0.14440
(0.026, 0.615) (-0.065, 0.566) (-0.070, 0.611) (-0.257, 0.493)
Age = 64 × ELSA 0.41565∗ 0.37602∗ 0.41384∗ 0.27913
(0.106, 0.693) (0.057, 0.673) (0.067, 0.710) (-0.096, 0.619)
Age = 65 × ELSA 0.50674∗ 0.42994 0.46272∗ 0.30557
(0.057, 0.821) (-0.026, 0.778) (0.020, 0.801) (-0.165, 0.700)
Age = 66 × ELSA 0.43941 0.30455 0.34520 0.20747
(-0.022, 0.798) (-0.160, 0.698) (-0.134, 0.746) (-0.300, 0.660)
obs 1027 899 782 671
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects reported. Empirical confidence intervals (in parentheses)
obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. ∗ indicates significance at 5%. ∗∗ indicates
significance at 1%. Agediff is age difference between spouses, defined as age of the husband minus age
of the wife. Sample: couples where both spouses work at baseline, husband’s age is between 55 and 66
at baseline, and wife’s age is less than 60 at baseline.
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Table 2.7: IV regression of husbands’ transitions on wives’ transitions. Marginal effects reported. (Continued in
next page).
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
Rst 0.11795 0.46392∗ 0.54210∗∗ 0.63521∗
(-0.302,0.527) (0.073,0.959) (0.119,1.077) (0.044,1.440)
ELSA 0.02576 0.00440 -0.02715 -0.00734
(-0.059,0.122) (-0.095,0.107) (-0.138,0.088) (-0.141,0.125)
Graduate -0.02602 -0.02578 -0.06677 -0.07441
(-0.141,0.082) (-0.151,0.095) (-0.197,0.063) (-0.214,0.072)
Graduate × ELSA 0.05814 0.06557 0.11868 0.12703
(-0.094,0.246) (-0.101,0.261) (-0.074,0.333) (-0.080,0.358)
High School -0.04447 -0.04469 -0.05122 -0.03975
(-0.114,0.047) (-0.118,0.053) (-0.116,0.034) (-0.114,0.058)
High School × ELSA 0.02924 0.02990 -0.00330 -0.02113
(-0.090,0.151) (-0.096,0.165) (-0.127,0.147) (-0.162,0.162)
Health=v good -0.07574∗∗ -0.10820∗∗ -0.09470∗∗ -0.07893∗
(-0.124,-0.026) (-0.161,-0.053) (-0.155,-0.034) (-0.145,-0.012)
Health=bad 0.02929 0.01256 0.02130 0.03067
(-0.040,0.107) (-0.063,0.096) (-0.063,0.114) (-0.065,0.132)
Health=v good × ELSA 0.00105 0.01852 -0.03448 -0.12350
(-0.100,0.105) (-0.095,0.142) (-0.159,0.109) (-0.256,0.039)
Health=bad × ELSA 0.06527 0.07733 0.07106 0.02032
(-0.085,0.224) (-0.082,0.244) (-0.106,0.271) (-0.175,0.260)
Sp heal=v good 0.02022 0.02004 0.01424 0.03441
(-0.029,0.068) (-0.036,0.074) (-0.047,0.074) (-0.032,0.102)
Sp heal=bad 0.02221 0.03491 0.05156 0.13253∗
(-0.054,0.114) (-0.054,0.131) (-0.045,0.157) (0.016,0.261)
Sp heal=v good ×ELSA 0.07495 0.09122 0.10413 0.06165
(-0.025,0.175) (-0.034,0.203) (-0.033,0.227) (-0.096,0.192)
Sp heal=bad × ELSA -0.02385 -0.01446 -0.08351 -0.22231
(-0.200,0.152) (-0.205,0.170) (-0.289,0.115) (-0.467,0.011)
Age = 56 0.02521 0.03943 0.09875 0.17091∗
(-0.063,0.134) (-0.069,0.168) (-0.039,0.251) (0.007,0.336)
Age = 57 -0.02884 -0.00099 0.04453 0.08161
(-0.119,0.081) (-0.108,0.131) (-0.092,0.198) (-0.088,0.267)
Age = 58 0.01525 0.00750 0.04218 0.10378
(-0.074,0.131) (-0.100,0.135) (-0.091,0.191) (-0.062,0.277)
Age = 59 0.02228 -0.00014 0.05101 0.09840
(-0.067,0.134) (-0.113,0.119) (-0.100,0.203) (-0.108,0.288)
Age = 60 0.08858 0.02948 0.05721 0.09336
(-0.019,0.209) (-0.090,0.154) (-0.084,0.202) (-0.083,0.263)
Age = 61 0.05600 -0.03565 -0.00736 -0.01567
(-0.064,0.195) (-0.167,0.092) (-0.162,0.141) (-0.206,0.155)
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects reported. Empirical confidence intervals (in paren-
theses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. ∗ indicates significance at 5%. ∗∗
indicates significance at 1%. Agediff is age difference between spouses, defined as age of the hus-
band minus age of the wife. Sample: couples where both spouses work at baseline, husband’s age
is between 55 and 66 at baseline, and wife’s age is less than 62 at baseline.
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Table 2.7: Continued from previous page.
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
Age = 62 0.10979 0.05533 0.08922 0.18903
(-0.006,0.244) (-0.078,0.194) (-0.075,0.251) (-0.004,0.371)
Age = 63 0.24726∗∗ 0.15796 0.17988 0.22275
(0.103,0.406) (-0.025,0.340) (-0.033,0.381) (-0.088,0.493)
Age = 64 0.29799∗∗ 0.23252∗ 0.25065∗ 0.27772∗
(0.145,0.450) (0.058,0.415) (0.050,0.452) (0.003,0.532)
Age = 65 0.25316∗∗ 0.17427 0.20111 0.21006
(0.065,0.431) (-0.026,0.377) (-0.021,0.411) (-0.060,0.460)
Age = 66 0.14411 0.09289 0.12970 0.15991
(-0.022,0.344) (-0.085,0.295) (-0.073,0.344) (-0.080,0.398)
Age = 56 × ELSA -0.03562 -0.11113 -0.08580 -0.23924
(-0.220,0.140) (-0.330,0.099) (-0.351,0.175) (-0.528,0.062)
Age = 57 × ELSA -0.01516 0.01183 -0.00432 -0.04823
(-0.214,0.174) (-0.225,0.245) (-0.291,0.274) (-0.373,0.269)
Age = 58 × ELSA 0.11204 0.13479 0.09012 0.00606
(-0.090,0.302) (-0.102,0.347) (-0.181,0.348) (-0.298,0.300)
Age = 59 × ELSA 0.06610 0.11668 0.09951 -0.02341
(-0.139,0.261) (-0.106,0.324) (-0.178,0.353) (-0.328,0.264)
Age = 60 × ELSA 0.02178 0.00143 -0.01860 -0.09685
(-0.186,0.242) (-0.218,0.229) (-0.276,0.249) (-0.388,0.196)
Age = 61 × ELSA 0.05907 0.05545 0.12151 0.06196
(-0.143,0.276) (-0.143,0.261) (-0.120,0.367) (-0.209,0.333)
Age = 62 × ELSA 0.10503 0.06017 0.12393 0.11250
(-0.142,0.357) (-0.195,0.306) (-0.162,0.402) (-0.218,0.436)
Age = 63 × ELSA 0.20703 0.17050 0.17789 0.12562
(-0.071,0.490) (-0.106,0.465) (-0.124,0.496) (-0.203,0.479)
Age = 64 × ELSA 0.29151 0.29073 0.29183 0.18592
(-0.046,0.596) (-0.054,0.602) (-0.064,0.622) (-0.177,0.528)
Age = 65 × ELSA 0.35704 0.18871 0.19290 0.05583
(-0.093,0.742) (-0.269,0.623) (-0.291,0.632) (-0.430,0.533)
Age = 66 × ELSA 0.12821 0.00675 0.00667 -0.14465
(-0.245,0.508) (-0.357,0.379) (-0.370,0.391) (-0.533,0.259)
obs 1169 996 861 717
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects reported. Empirical confidence intervals (in paren-
theses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. ∗ indicates significance at 5%. ∗∗
indicates significance at 1%. Agediff is age difference between spouses, defined as age of the hus-
band minus age of the wife. Sample: couples where both spouses work at baseline, husband’s age
is between 55 and 66 at baseline, and wife’s age is less than 62 at baseline.
44
Table 2.8: Probit regression of husbands’ transitions on dummies indicating whether their wives reach ages 60 and
62. Marginal effects reported. (Continued in next page).
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
∆60st -0.01424 0.03032 0.02972 0.00435
(-0.066,0.045) (-0.036,0.105) (-0.044,0.115) (-0.077,0.099)
∆60st×ELSA 0.04994 0.17656∗ 0.15564 0.21871∗
(-0.069,0.175) (0.025,0.339) (-0.015,0.336) (0.022,0.426)
∆62st 0.06408 0.06957 0.06816 0.09415
(-0.006,0.143) (-0.016,0.168) (-0.027,0.178) (-0.034,0.245)
∆62st×ELSA -0.08776 -0.13591 -0.13296 -0.11330
(-0.240,0.058) (-0.321,0.044) (-0.337,0.064) (-0.391,0.171)
ELSA 0.06297∗∗ 0.06354∗ 0.07309∗ 0.11534∗∗
(0.013,0.116) (0.010,0.120) (0.013,0.138) (0.040,0.193)
Graduate 0.00969 0.00777 -0.01235 -0.01512
(-0.051,0.069) (-0.057,0.071) (-0.084,0.057) (-0.095,0.062)
High School -0.02525 -0.02854 -0.05586 -0.05198
(-0.081,0.036) (-0.089,0.037) (-0.121,0.014) (-0.125,0.028)
Graduate × ELSA 0.04591 0.05633 0.05791 0.06878
(-0.069,0.166) (-0.066,0.186) (-0.076,0.200) (-0.079,0.228)
High School × ELSA 0.01299 0.00046 -0.05212 -0.08837
(-0.105,0.135) (-0.126,0.130) (-0.187,0.086) (-0.239,0.072)
Health = v good -0.06797∗∗ -0.09529∗∗ -0.08440∗∗ -0.07846∗
(-0.116,-0.020) (-0.147,-0.044) (-0.142,-0.028) (-0.142,-0.016)
Health = v good × ELSA 0.02660 0.01290 0.01134 0.01999
(-0.038,0.100) (-0.054,0.089) (-0.063,0.097) (-0.065,0.118)
Health = bad -0.01566 -0.03057 -0.10513 -0.16170∗
(-0.113,0.084) (-0.136,0.080) (-0.221,0.018) (-0.291,-0.025)
Health = bad × ELSA 0.06707 0.07408 0.01422 -0.03158
(-0.084,0.221) (-0.082,0.234) (-0.154,0.188) (-0.222,0.166)
Sp heal = v good 0.02228 0.02415 0.01951 0.02307
(-0.025,0.068) (-0.027,0.073) (-0.036,0.073) (-0.038,0.082)
Sp heal = v good × ELSA 0.02549 0.04405 0.04112 0.04984
(-0.048,0.115) (-0.038,0.143) (-0.050,0.153) (-0.058,0.183)
Sp heal = bad 0.07849 0.11728∗ 0.13349∗ 0.10112
(-0.014,0.174) (0.015,0.221) (0.022,0.249) (-0.022,0.230)
Sp heal = bad × ELSA -0.00129 0.01736 -0.05780 -0.11268
(-0.159,0.164) (-0.161,0.205) (-0.259,0.152) (-0.351,0.125)
Age = 56 0.02565 0.03628 0.08887 0.12820
(-0.058,0.130) (-0.064,0.164) (-0.041,0.247) (-0.035,0.318)
Age = 57 -0.02761 -0.00123 0.04933 0.07783
(-0.105,0.071) (-0.095,0.117) (-0.074,0.201) (-0.078,0.266)
Age = 58 -0.01339 -0.02636 0.04787 0.19048
(-0.141,0.182) (-0.159,0.187) (-0.141,0.315) (-0.089,0.494)
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects reported. Empirical confidence intervals (in paren-
theses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. ∗ indicates significance at 5%. ∗∗
indicates significance at 1%. Agediff is age difference between spouses, defined as age of the hus-
band minus age of the wife. Sample: couples where both spouses work at baseline, husband’s age
is between 55 and 66 at baseline, and wife’s age is less than 62 at baseline.
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Table 2.8: Continued from previous page.
Full sample Agediff >0 Agediff >1 Agediff >2
Age = 59 0.03288 0.04378 0.11006 0.17188∗
(-0.054,0.145) (-0.056,0.175) (-0.018,0.267) (0.008,0.356)
Age = 60 0.09342 0.06073 0.09273 0.12710
(-0.006,0.210) (-0.048,0.190) (-0.039,0.244) (-0.033,0.304)
Age = 61 0.07088 0.03471 0.07830 0.08071
(-0.034,0.182) (-0.073,0.153) (-0.051,0.221) (-0.069,0.251)
Age = 62 0.10929 0.09592 0.14622∗ 0.21118∗
(-0.005,0.238) (-0.024,0.234) (0.002,0.301) (0.031,0.394)
Age = 63 0.23254∗∗ 0.20966∗∗ 0.25701∗∗ 0.33015∗∗
(0.100,0.376) (0.070,0.364) (0.104,0.421) (0.147,0.514)
Age = 64 0.27949∗∗ 0.25849∗∗ 0.30321∗∗ 0.33860∗∗
(0.121,0.438) (0.098,0.427) (0.133,0.477) (0.149,0.531)
Age = 65 0.23852∗ 0.20385∗ 0.24720∗ 0.27515∗
(0.047,0.412) (0.011,0.383) (0.055,0.432) (0.066,0.481)
Age = 66 0.11640 0.07871 0.12745 0.14637
(-0.045,0.310) (-0.078,0.278) (-0.051,0.348) (-0.055,0.391)
Age = 56 × ELSA -0.02094 -0.06748 -0.01304 -0.15152
(-0.217,0.151) (-0.305,0.137) (-0.309,0.242) (-0.498,0.163)
Age = 57 × ELSA -0.02017 0.01396 0.05442 0.00381
(-0.214,0.166) (-0.214,0.231) (-0.237,0.327) (-0.346,0.318)
Age = 58 × ELSA 0.00792 0.01073 0.07327 0.20972
(-0.101,0.187) (-0.106,0.209) (-0.082,0.295) (-0.017,0.418)
Age = 59 × ELSA 0.06179 0.07993 0.11591 -0.01353
(-0.140,0.250) (-0.152,0.291) (-0.164,0.366) (-0.344,0.286)
Age = 60 × ELSA 0.04153 -0.02341 0.01512 -0.01885
(-0.172,0.249) (-0.254,0.202) (-0.262,0.281) (-0.338,0.287)
Age = 61 × ELSA 0.09203 0.03675 0.11347 -0.02762
(-0.127,0.325) (-0.199,0.289) (-0.174,0.401) (-0.358,0.302)
Age = 62 × ELSA 0.14888 0.15432 0.18798 0.00199
(-0.106,0.392) (-0.111,0.414) (-0.129,0.480) (-0.370,0.355)
Age = 63 × ELSA 0.27645∗ 0.26023 0.29872 0.19217
(0.001,0.516) (-0.039,0.522) (-0.025,0.573) (-0.175,0.517)
Age = 64 × ELSA 0.33246∗ 0.31773 0.35361 0.21854
(0.012,0.605) (-0.020,0.603) (-0.004,0.639) (-0.176,0.555)
Age = 65 × ELSA 0.44452∗ 0.40715 0.46705∗ 0.34042
(0.044,0.776) (-0.005,0.765) (0.048,0.801) (-0.116,0.727)
Age = 66 × ELSA 0.22300 0.15986 0.21232 0.08008
(-0.147,0.568) (-0.214,0.525) (-0.209,0.589) (-0.375,0.507)
obs 1169 996 861 717
NOTE.- Average individual marginal effects reported. Empirical confidence intervals (in paren-
theses) obtained from 2,500 parametric bootstrap replications. ∗ indicates significance at 5%. ∗∗
indicates significance at 1%. Agediff is age difference between spouses, defined as age of the hus-
band minus age of the wife. Sample: couples where both spouses work at baseline, husband’s age
is between 55 and 66 at baseline, and wife’s age is less than 62 at baseline.
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Chapter 3
The Wage Process of Older
Workers
50
3.1 Introduction
This chapter estimates the shape of the age-wage profile of older career workers. Whether
wages decline with age for workers who remain in their career job is a crucial question for
both economic analysis and policy. Expected earnings play a key role in the retirement
choice, and as such are an essential input to option value models and other structural
models of savings and labor supply of older workers. Measures of expected earnings are
used to compute the present value of Social Security’s expected revenue stream. And, since
they shape the incentives for workers to remain employed, they are needed to evaluate the
effectiveness of policies aimed at delaying retirement.
Different theories of wage determination have different predictions on the shape of the
age-wage profile at older ages. While the human-capital theory (Mincer (1974), Becker
(1975)) predicts wage declines before retirement, both Lazear’s (1979) model of deferred
compensation and the forced savings hypothesis (Frank and Hutchens (1993), Neumark
(1995)) are consistent with monotonically increasing wage profiles.
When testing the predictions of these theories, it is important to understand the nature
of the retirement process. In particular, we know that for a majority of workers retirement
is not a dichotomous switch from full employment into inactivity. Rather, most workers
partially retire before completely withdrawing from the labor force. During the semi-
retirement years, workers usually take on part-time jobs, often outside the industry and
occupation of the career job. Repeated exits and re-entries into the labor force are also
common.
In this chapter we argue that the theoretical models of wage determination mentioned
above characterize the wage path of career workers. Both Lazear’s model and the forced-
saving hypothesis describe long-term contracts that can only arise under the prospect of
an enduring relationship between firm and employee. This excludes the type of short-
term contracts that partially-retired workers usually engage in. The human capital model
focuses on the role of human-capital depreciation in leading to wage declines at older
ages. It abstracts from other motives for wage declines that arise when a worker enters
partial retirement, such as a part-time wage penalty, the lower quality of jobs taken by
semi-retired workers, etc. As such, its predictions only apply to the age-wage profile of
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workers who remain in the career job.
The empirical literature that has tested for wage declines has not distinguished between
career and partially retired workers. Since semi-retired workers have lower wages than
career ones, the wage drops at older ages that have been documented in previous studies
are likely partly capturing late-career switches into partial retirement. This leaves open
the question of whether any wage declines set in while workers are in the career job. The
answer to this question will allow to evaluate the predictions of the different theoretical
models. Moreover, it will provide an estimate of the return to work for non-retired older
workers, a crucial parameter both for economic analysis and policy evaluation.
In this chapter, we test for wage declines for career workers, controlling for selection
out of the career job. We find no statistical evidence of such declines for any education
or pension-type group. We conclude that any wage decline to accommodate drops in
productivity with age, if present, occurs only when the individual goes into semi-retirement
or full retirement, either switching to part-time work or completely withdrawing from the
labor force.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the theoretical and
empirical results on the relationship between age and wages. Section 3.3 describes the
data. Section 3.4 analyzes cross-sectional wage-age profiles in the Census and Health and
Retirement Study. Section 3.5 introduces the statistical model for wages. The results are
presented in section 3.6, and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Relationship Between Age and Wages
The human capital model (Becker (1964), Mincer (1974)) predicts that individual invest-
ment in (general) human capital will diminish over time due to both declining marginal
benefits and increasing marginal costs. In the absence of depreciation, this implies that
wages will reach a peak and remain on a plateau thereafter. Adding depreciation of edu-
cation capital and skills leads to negative net investment in human capital at older ages,
and hence earnings profiles with an inverted-U shape.
The aging process itself may lead to declines in productivity beyond those caused by
human capital depreciation. The incidence of illness increases at older ages. And the de-
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cline in cognitive capabilities, which starts at some point during early adulthood, becomes
particularly noticeable after the age of 50 (Skirbekk (2004), Verhaegen and Salthouse
(1997)). Both factors may translate into further reductions in wages.
Alternative theories of wage growth over the life cycle do not necessarily predict de-
clines in wages with age. Lazear’s model (1979) of deferred compensation, for instance,
is compatible with monotonically increasing wages up to the point where the worker is
compelled to retire.1
The forced-savings hypothesis (Frank and Hutchens (1993), Loewenstein and Sicher-
man (1991), Neumark (1995)) states that individuals have a preference for rising con-
sumption profiles. In the presence of self-control problems, increasing wage profiles are a
substitute for personal savings that allows workers to finance an upward-sloping consump-
tion profile. In this scenario, firms can always find a profitable way of providing workers
with rising wage profiles by decreasing compensation in the earlier career years.
These theoretical analyses characterize the wage path of career workers. They would
be a good description of observed wage paths if retirement implied a clean switch from
the career job into inactivity. The reality is, however, that a majority of workers partially
retire before completely withdrawing from the labor force.2 During the partial retirement
period, which can span several years, workers take on bridge jobs (so called because they
bridge the gap between full employment and full retirement), usually on a part-time basis
and outside the industry and occupation of the career job. This phase at the end of a
worker’s career is often characterized by intermittent attachment to the labor force, with
workers going through spells of inactivity before returning to part-time or even full-time
work.3
The dynamics of the retirement process are key to the analysis of potential declines
in wages. It is important not only to establish whether wages decline with age, but
if so, at which point in the career of an individual these declines set in. Evidence of
declining wages while individuals remain in their career job would provide support to the
1In the absence of mandatory retirement, pension incentives can be designed so as to strongly encourage
retirement at specific ages.
2Cahill et al. (2005) find that one-half to two-thirds of workers in full-time career jobs take on bridge
jobs before exiting the labor force.
3See Cahill et al. (2005), Gustman and Steinmeier (1985), Honig and Hanoch (1985), Quinn (1996),
and Ruhm (1990) for a detailed description of the retirement process and its evolution over time.
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human capital model, and reject the forced-savings hypothesis. While Lazear’s model
does not necessarily rule out declining wage profiles, the most prevalent version of the
model predicts monotonically rising wage profiles, and would also be rejected by evidence
of declining wages for workers who remain in the career job.
Wage declines that only set in after (partial) retirement are consistent with both the
deferred-compensation model and the forced-savings hypothesis. They are more difficult to
reconcile with the human capital model, because they could be explained by reasons other
than the depreciation of general human capital. First, workers who move into a bridge
job give up all the firm-specific human capital they had accumulated on the career job.
Second, partially retired workers may choose bridge jobs that require less effort in exchange
of a lower wage rate.4 Finally, most bridge jobs are part-time jobs. In the presence of a
part-time wage penalty, even individuals who move to observationally equivalent part-time
jobs would earn less once they leave their career job.
Nevertheless, evidence that wages do not decline before retirement may not be inter-
preted as a conclusive rejection of the human capital model. If employers face restrictions
in their ability to reduce real wages of career workers (e.g. for contractual reasons), they
may instead choose to give those whose productivity falls below some threshold incentives
to retire. In this case, declines in productivity would only translate into wage drops at
the time of separation from the career job.
Beyond its consistency with the different theoretical models, the timing of wage declines
also has important policy implications. In view of looming shortfalls in public pension
systems, most OECD countries are introducing policies to encourage individuals to remain
employed for longer. The US Social Security Administration has recently introduced
reforms aimed at increasing the return to work at older ages, including a gradual increase
of the full retirement age from 65 to 67; the elimination of penalties associated to delaying
benefit claiming beyond full retirement age; and the elimination of the earnings test after
full retirement age (Maestas and Zissimopoulos (2010)). In order to predict the effects of
this type of policy changes, it is crucial to know the shape of the wage profile for workers
who remain fully employed. If wages decrease before partial retirement, much stronger
4Partially retired individuals have often started drawing Social Security of private pensions. Johnson
and Neumark (1995) argue that this increase in wealth could lead them to reduce either hours or effort.
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incentives will be needed to keep workers in their career jobs - limiting the effectiveness
of such policies.
The empirical literature examining the relationship between wages and age provides
cross-sectional evidence of wage and earnings declines at older ages.5 These cannot, of
course, be interpreted as unequivocal evidence of longitudinal wage declines, as the pres-
ence of cohort effects or selection may lead to spurious wage declines in a cross-section
even if longitudinal profiles are flat.
We turn therefore to longitudinal analyses. Ruggles and Ruggles (1974) study Social
Security earnings records for different cohorts over the years 1957 to 1969 and find no
evidence of wage declines at any point during the life cycle. Honig and Hanoch (1985),
using Social Security records from 1951 to 1974, conclude instead that earnings profiles for
working males decline after age 58, with sharp drops after the Social Security retirement
ages. Johnson and Neumark (1995) use individual hourly wage data from 1966 to 1983
and find evidence of wage declines for workers in their 60’s. They attribute a sizeable part
of these declines to interactions with the Social Security early and full retirement ages.
The aforementioned longitudinal analyses do not explicitly separate wage data from
individuals who are in the career job from those who are partially retired. Given the nature
of the jobs held by semi-retired workers, there is a question of how much of these declines
can be attributed to the switch into partial retirement. Honig and Hanoch and Johnson
and Neumark’s findings of strong wage declines at Social Security ages are particularly
significant, as there is evidence that the incidence of partial retirement increases at those
particular ages (Aaronson and French (2004)). This leaves open the question of whether
wage declines set in while workers are in the career job.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) underscore the importance of separating non-retired
from semi-retired workers. Their paper stresses that mixing up the two “may be adequate
for describing the wage path currently traveled by older workers, but it is not adequate for
describing the opportunity set they face”. They find that estimating a wage equation on a
sample of individuals who have not (partially) retired decreases the wage drop associated
to moving from 40 to 52 years of experience from 22 percent to 8 percent. They do not
5Mincer (1974) and Ruggles and Ruggles (1977) analyze earning profiles, Hurd (1971) and Johnson and
Neumark (1995) present evidence from wage profiles.
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control for selection out of the career job, so it is possible that even this figure overstates
the true decline in wages before retirement.
This paper extends previous work by testing for declines in wage rates for individuals
who remain in the career job. We estimate separate wage equations for different pension
and education categories. Also, acknowledging that the decision to go into partial retire-
ment may not be random, we control for selection out of the career job within pension
and education categories, and find strong evidence of negative selection.
We find no statistical evidence of wage declines for individuals who remain in the
career job. Our results are consistent Lazear’s model of deferred compensation and the
forced-savings hypothesis. They are not inconsistent with the human capital model, but
imply that any wage adjustments due to declining productivity would happen only once
the individual has entered the retirement phase.
3.3 Data
We use data from two different sources, the 1990 US Census 5% Public Use Micro Sample
(PUMS)6 and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
The 1990 Census PUMS is a 1-in-20 cross-sectional sample of the US population. It
provides information on standard economic and demographic characteristics of respon-
dents, including age, gender, employment status, hours worked, and wage income. We use
the 1990 Census data in the descriptive analysis of the cross-sectional age-wage profile.
For our primary analysis we use data from the HRS, a nationally representative sample
of adults over 50 years of age. We focus on the HRS baseline cohort, which consists of
individuals born between the years 1931 and 1941, inclusive7. They were interviewed
for the first time in 1992, and subsequently every two years. We use the 9 waves that
are currently available, spanning from 1992 to 2008. The advantages of the HRS with
respect to the Census are its panel structure, with individuals being followed for up to 16
years, and the detailed information it provides on demographics, health status, job-related
6The data were obtained from the IPUMS-USA database (http://usa.ipums.org/usa/). See Ruggles et
al. (2010).
7The HRS cohort also includes spouses of individuals born between the years 1931 and 1941. We restrict
our sample to individuals born within those years.
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variables and pension types. Its main drawbacks are the smaller sample size and the lack
of information for individuals below the age of 50. This is adequate for our purposes,
however, since the paper focuses on older individuals.
We choose to focus on the the 1990 Census to have a sample that is most directly
comparable to the HRS one. In the year 1990, individuals in the HRS baseline cohort
where 49 to 59 years-old, and thus exactly at the age when cross-sectional hourly wages
begin to decline. We have repeated the analysis using data from the 1980 and 2000 Census,
and the results are qualitatively unchanged.
From the Census data we build the variable measuring hours worked per year as the
product of usual hours worked per week and weeks worked last year. Hourly wages are
calculated dividing wage and salary income in the previous year by hours worked that
year. Participation categories are defined based on usual hours worked per week. Full-
time workers are those working more than 30 hours per week. Part-time workers are those
working between 6 and 30 hours per week. Individuals working 5 or less hours per week
are considered inactive8.
The HRS data come from the RAND-HRS Data File (see RAND HRS Data (2010)
for a description). The wage variable that we use for the analysis is the (hourly) Wage
Rate. Participation categories are defined according to the variable Hours of work per
week at current job. As before, full-time workers are those working more than 30 hours
per week, part-time workers are those working between 6 and 30 hours per week, and
those working 5 or less hours per week are considered inactive. We define two education
categories. The highest one includes individuals who have at least some college, and the
lowest one pools high-school graduates and those who have not finished high-school. An
individual is considered to be in bad health if he describes his health status as “fair” or
“poor”, and is considered to be in good health if he says his health is “excellent”, “very
good”, or “good”. The wealth variable that we use is Total Wealth (Excluding Secondary
Residence), which includes the value of the primary residence and all financial assets net
of mortgages or debt.
Pension type is a crucial variable in our analysis, as separate wage processes are esti-
8We have experimented with different participation thresholds (5, 2, and 0 hours per week) and the
participation profiles are barely affected.
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mated for individuals with different pension types. It is defined defined according to the
variable Type of pension from current job. An individual is assigned the type of pension
he has in the period he enters the sample. The value of this variable does not change
even if the individual leaves the job. This is intended to capture the pension type that
individuals had in the career job.
3.4 Analysis of Cross-Sectional Age-Wage Profiles
The median- and average-hourly wage profiles for men in the 1990 Census, shown in figure
3.1, confirm previous evidence that cross-sectional male wages peak in the late 40’s and
later decrease with age.
Figure 3.1: Cross-Sectional Wage Profile. Men. 1990.
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NOTE. - Source: Author’s calculations using 1990 Census-PUMS. Average
wage computed using observations between 5th and 95th percentile for each
age.
From a peak value of $15.67 per hour at age 47 to $11.41 per hour at age 73, average
wages decline by 27% (p-value=0.00). The decline is initially slow, and it accelerates
after the Social Security early retirement age of 62. Median wages decline more quickly
than average wages, and the two series diverge noticeably from the mid 50’s. From peak
($14.68 at age 47) to trough ($8.11 at age 77), mean wages drop by 45% (p-value for
nonparametric test of equality of medians is 0.00).
There are many possible explanations for a declining cross-sectional wage profile for
older workers, only some of which are related to the effects of age and experience. These
explanations include changes in the proportion of part-time workers, cohort effects, and
selection. Below we examine each one in turn.
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3.4.1 Full-Time vs. Part-Time Work
This paper is concerned with the age-wage profile of career workers. Different criteria can
be used to distinguish between career workers and those partially retired, but most of
them include a measure of the number of hours worked because, as explained in section
3.2, the majority of bridge jobs taken during retirement are part-time jobs. In the absence
of information on tenure or past spells of part-time work to further refine our measure, we
can classify Census observations according to the number of weekly hours worked, under
the assumption that full-time workers are the most likely to remain in the career job, while
part-time workers are the most likely to have entered partial retirement.
An analysis of the proportion of part-time workers in the labor force during the retire-
ment years can illustrate how combining observations of full- and part-time workers may
exacerbate cross-sectional wage declines. Figure 3.2 shows total, full-time, and part-time
participation rates for men in 1990. Full-time participation stabilizes at around 90% once
men complete their education, and remains virtually constant until the late 40’s. Then,
at around the same time as wages start declining, full-time employment begins to drop.
The decline is initially slow (21 percentage points between ages 50 and 61 (p-value of the
difference is 0.00), equivalent to 2 percentage points per year), accelerating as workers
reach the early and full Social Security retirement ages of 62 and 65, respectively: full
time participation drops by 37 percentage points between ages 61 and 66 (p-value=0.00),
equivalent to 7.4 percentage points per year.
Figure 3.2: Total, Full- and Part-Time Participation. Men. 1990.
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Part-time participation, on the other hand, rises by 4 percentage points between ages
50 and 61 (p-value=0.00), and by 6 further percentage points between ages 61 and 66
(p-value=0.00), before declining thereafter. As a result of the diverging trends in full-time
and part-time participation, the proportion of part-time workers increases steadily from
the late 40’s until the late 70’s. By age 78, 47% of workers are part-time employees.
This change in the composition of the labor force may explain part of the wage drop
observed in figure 3.1. Previous studies that found evidence of wage declines in samples
mixing full-time and part-time workers may have been picking up the shift from full-time
to part-time if part-time wage rates are lower than full-time ones.
There are several reasons why we would expect to see a gap between full-time and part-
time wages. First, there may be a part-time wage penalty, whereby part-time workers earn
less per hour than full-time ones with similar skills and in similar jobs9. Second, the average
part-time job may be different from the average full-time job. It is likely that semi-retired
workers will take on jobs with different characteristics from their career job, e.g. jobs that
carry less responsibility and require less effort. Third, workers in their career jobs tend
to have longer tenures than those in bridge-jobs, and will have accumulated more specific
human capital. Finally, if workers leave their career job when their productivity begins
to decline, there may be unobservable differences between those in full- and part-time
employment.
Figure 3.3 confirms that part-time wages are lower at older ages. Median part-time
wages, shown in the right panel, are below median full-time wages at all ages (equality
can be rejected with a p-value of 0.00 at every age between 25 and 79), while average
part-time wages, shown on the left panel, are lower than full-time ones for workers older
than 60 (equality can be rejected at all ages between 61 and 72 with p-value=0.00).
Interestingly, excluding part-time employees from the sample does not eliminate the
late-career drop in wages. Figure 3.4 compares the age-wage profile for all employees with
that of full-time employees. Restricting the sample to full-time workers delays the onset
of the decline in wages, but the drop is still noticeable, particularly after workers become
eligible for early Social Security retirement benefits at age 62.
9Hirsch (2005) finds evidence of a wage gap between full-time and part-time workers that persist after
controlling for standard measures of worker and job attributes.
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Figure 3.3: Average (left) and Median (right) Full-Time and Part-Time Wage. Men. 1990.
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NOTE. - Source: Author’s calculations using 1990 Census-IPUMS. Average wage computed using observations
between 5th and 95th percentile for each age.
Figure 3.4: Average (left) and Median (right) Wage for All Employed vs. FT Employed. Men. 1990.
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NOTE. - Source: Author’s calculations using 1990 Census-IPUMS. Average wage computed using observations
between 5th and 95th percentile for each age.
There are several reasons why the decline in full-time wages in figure 3.4 cannot be
interpreted as evidence of productivity declines without further analysis. On top of cohort
effects, it may be the result of selection, as the decision to leave the career job is likely not
random, and the marginal full-time worker may be changing with age. Previous studies
of age-wage profiles at older ages, from Hurd (1971) to Johnson and Neumark (1996)
and Myck (2007), have suggested an important role for selection but none has formally
quantified its effects. In order to control for selection out of the career job, we need a
panel of individuals approaching the end of their working lives.
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3.4.2 Cross-Sectional Age-Wage Profiles in the HRS
In the next sections, we will use data from the HRS to estimate individual age-wage
profiles. As mentioned in section 3.3, the HRS is a panel dataset that follows the cohort
of individuals born between the years 1931 and 1941 for a maximum of 16 years, starting
in 1992. While the main appeal of these data is their panel structure, it is useful to start
by analyzing the cross-sectional wage profiles in the HRS, which we can compare to the
ones obtained from the Census.
Making use of the panel structure of the HRS, figure 3.5 plots the 1990 Census median
full-time age-wage profile against repeated cross-sections from selected HRS waves. The
first noticeable aspect is that the wage series from the HRS lie somewhat below the one
from the Census10. More importantly, the HRS series confirm the decline in cross-sectional
wages observed in the 1990 Census. Also, the different cross-sections overlap, from which
we conclude that there is no evidence of cohort effects within the birth-year range used to
select the sample.
Figure 3.5: Median Cross-Sectional Full-Time Age-Wage Profile. Men. Selected Years.
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NOTE. - Source: Author’s calculations using 1990 Census-PUMS and HRS.
HRS wages deflated to 1989 dollars using CPI. Results reported for wave-age
cells containing at least 30 observations.
Finally, the right panel of figure 3.6 shows once more the median Census age-wage
profile against the equivalent one in the HRS, this time pooling all observations available
10The main reason why the two series are not totally comparable is the definition of wage income, which
is narrower in the HRS (where individuals are asked to report the wage rate for “regular work time” only)
and broader in the Census, where as well as regular wages it includes “commissions, cash bonuses, tips,
and any other income received from an employer”. On the other hand, the differences cannot be attributed
to cohort effects, as the average individual in the 1990 Census series was born in 1932, while the average
individual in the HRS-wave 1 series was born in 1936.
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for every age. The HRS series closely tracks the wage declines observed in the Census.
Between age 51 and age 59, median full-time wages drop by 22% in the Census (p-value
of the difference =0.00) and by 26% in the HRS (p-value=0.00). The left panel of figure
3.6 tells a similar story for average wages, which fall by 13% in the Census and by 16% in
the HRS between those ages (p-values of both differences below 0.01).
It is the HRS profile of average wages, shown on the left panel of figure 3.6, that will
be the focus of the econometric analysis of the following sections.
Figure 3.6: Average (left) and Median (right) Full-Time Age-Wage Profiles in the 1990 Census and HRS. Men.
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NOTE. - Source: 1990 Census-IPUMS and HRS. Average wage computed using observations
between 5th and 95th 1990-Census percentiles for each age. HRS wages deflated to 1989 dollars
using CPI.
3.5 The Statistical Model for Wages
Denote by wit the hourly log-wage of individual i in period t, with i = 1, ..., I and t =
1, ..., T . We assume a standard Mincerian specification for log-wages, but we include age,
rather than experience, as our main regressor:
wit =
J∑
k=j
δkI{age = k}+Xitβ + u∗it, (3.5.1)
where the coefficients on the age dummies, δj , identify the age-profile of log-hourly
wages, Xit is a vector of other observables and u∗it is the stochastic component of log
wages. u∗it is the sum of an unobserved time-constant individual specific factor, and an
idiosyncratic error term:
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u∗it = υi + uit, (3.5.2)
where the distributional assumptions on υi and uit will be made explicit below.
The main aim of the paper is to obtain consistent estimates of δk for k = j, ..., J and β.
We will use a sample of older workers to estimate equation 3.5.1. Given that a significant
fraction of these workers enters (semi-)retirement every year, with their decision to leave
the career job driven by a myriad of factors, both observable and unobservable by the
econometrician, we do not want to assume that our sample has been randomly selected
from the population. Below we describe the procedure -based on Wooldridge (1995)- used
to correct for selection.
We begin by specifying the selection process. The wage associated to the career job is
only observed before a worker starts working part-time or retires. We assume the following
form for the structural selection equation, where the binary indicator Pit is equal to 1
whenever career-work wages are observed:
Pit = I{Xitθ + νi + ξit} (3.5.3)
νi and ξit are assumed jointly normally distributed with E(ξit) = 0 and ξit independent
of Xit for all t.11 So as to allow the time-persistent individual effect to be correlated with
observables, we adopt a correlated random effects specifications, as in Chamberlain (1980):
ASS1 : νi = Xiδ + ²i,
where ²i is independent ofXi with a zero-mean normal distribution, andXi = {Xit}Tt=1.
Defining µit ≡ ²i + ξit, we obtain the following reduced-form expression for the selection
equation:
Pit = I{Xitθ +Xiδ + µit} (3.5.4)
The main assumptions needed to identify the coefficients of the wage equation are the
11The vector Xit in equation 3.5.3 includes exclusion restrictions that are not part of the set of regressors
in the wage equation.
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following:
ASS2 : E(uit | Xi, µit) = E(uit | µit) = ρtµit
ASS3 : E(υi | Xi, µit) = L(υi|Xi, µit)
The conditional mean independence assumption stated in the first equality of ASS2
always holds if (uit, µit) are independent of Xi, something that is usually maintained in the
selection context. The second equality in ASS2, which states that the conditional mean
of uit is linear in µit, is not crucial for identification and could be relaxed. It is, however,
implied by the standard assumption in selection-correction models of joint normality of
(uit, µit).
ASS3 is certainly stronger. Notice that, without µit inside the conditioning set, it
would be similar to the one used in Chamberlain (1980). What the addition of µit buys
us is the ability to correct for sample selection bias in the presence of an individual time-
constant component, while allowing this to be correlated with the X’s -something crucial
in the context of the wage equation.
Under ASS3, we can write:
L(υi|Xi, µit) = Π0 +Xi1Π1 + ...+XiTΠT + φtµit
Making use of ASS1, ASS2 and ASS3, the wage equation can be written as:
E(wit|Xi, µit) = Xitβ +XiΠ+ γtµit,
where γt = ρt + φt. Conditioning on Pit = 1 and assuming, without loss of generality,
that E((µit)2) = 1, yields
E(wit|Xi, Pit = 1) = Xitβ +XiΠ+ γtλ(Xiµt),
where λ is the inverse Mills ratio.
In the empirical section we will make the simplifying assumption that γt = γ for all
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t. We will also assume, as in Mundlak (1978), that the time-constant unobserved effects
depend on the vector Xi only through the time-average of Xit for each individual, denoted
X¯i. Finally, for variables that do not vary in time it is not possible to separately identity
their contemporaneous effect from their effect through the fixed effect. We will assume
that they only have an effect through the fixed effect, and interpret their coefficients
accordingly.
Consistent estimates of the age profile and β are obtained by first estimating equation
3.5.4 by pooled probit across i and t, generating the estimated inverse Mills ratios λ̂it, and
then running a pooled OLS regression of lnwit on I{age = k} for k = j, ..., J , Xit, X¯i,
and λ̂it for the selected sample.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Exclusion Restrictions
We use a series of exclusion restrictions to achieve nonparametric identification of the
model. The first variables from the vectorXit that are excluded from the wage equation are
indicators that the individual is above the Social Security early retirement age (ERA) and
full retirement age (FRA). These indicators were proposed as instruments for the number
of hours worked by Aaronson and French (2004). Past the Social Security ages, individuals
face several incentives to reduce their work hours. First, workers who claim benefits and
continue to work face the Social Security earnings test, which leads to a reduction of $1 of
benefits for every $2 of earnings above a threshold.12 Second, liquidity-constrained workers
may not be able to reduce their work hours until they become eligible for Social Security
benefits. Finally, by age 65 all workers who are eligible for Social Security become eligible
for Medicare. Individuals younger than 65 who have employer-provided health insurance
have an incentive to remain in the job until that age, as temporary bridge jobs are less
likely to provide health insurance.
12Benefits lost through the earnings test are replaced in the form of higher benefits in the future at
a rate that is roughly actuarially fair, so rather than a tax the earnings test acts as an intertemporal
transfer. Nevertheless, if individuals are present-biased, they may prefer to enjoy leisure today rather than
to work today for a reduced net wage in exchange for higher benefits in the future. Second, there is some
evidence that individuals misunderstand the complicated rules of the earnings test, and they may perceive
the adjustment as less than actuarially fair (Michaud and Van Soest (2007)).
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The next exclusion restriction is a measure of wealth in the current period. Notice that
our regressions control for lifetime wealth through the linearization of the time-constant
individual component. Lifetime wealth is not exogenous to the retirement decision, as
individuals may save in order to finance early retirement, and it would not be a valid
exclusion restriction if individuals with higher lifetime wages end up accumulating more
wealth. However, after controlling for lifetime wealth, current wealth measures the effect
of deviations from the long-run value. Under our maintained assumption that these are
exogenous to other individual characteristics, current wealth is a valid exclusion restriction.
We also use as an exclusion restriction an indicator that there is an outstanding mort-
gage in the household. Controlling for lifetime wealth, the existence of this fixed monthly
expense should reduce the individual’s willingness to cut his work hours or stop working,
as this would reduce the income available to pay the mortgage in any future period.
An indicator of whether the worker’s employment-provided health insurance policy
covers his wife should capture an extra incentive for him to remain employed until his
partner reaches age 65 and becomes eligible for Medicare coverage.
Finally, for low-education individuals, we include as an exclusion restriction an indica-
tor that the wife is over age 62. This should increase the likelihood that she is retired, as
there is a large spike in women’s retirements at age 62. Given the correlation in spouses’
retirement dates (Casanova (2010)), the indicator should, in turn, capture an extra incen-
tive for the husband to retire. We find that this indicator is never significant in predicting
the full-time participation propensity for the highly educated, and therefore we opt for
removing it from those regressions. This suggests either that the correlation in spouses’
retirement dates is not as strong for highly-educated individuals, or that highly educated
individuals’ partners are less likely to retire at 62.
3.6.2 Selection equation
For the estimation of the age-wage profiles, we separate individuals according to their
education level and pension type. Table 3.3 shows the results from the estimation of the
selection equation. The dependent variable in this equation is an indicator that equals 1 if
the individual is a career worker. It is equal to 0 if the individuals has (semi)retired, both
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if he continues to work part-time and if he has completely withdrawn from the labor force.
The coefficients reported in the table are divided into three groups. The first one, shown
on the top panel of the table, shows the coefficients of explanatory variables that enter
both the selection and the wage equations. The middle panel shows the coefficients of the
exclusion restrictions. The third panel shows the coefficients of the variables that enter
the selection and wage equations through the linearization of the unobserved individual
effect.
The first and the fourth columns show results for the samples of men who have some
college education and those who at most graduated from high school, respectively. The
results indicate that the probability of being a career worker decreases with age, and it
is significantly lower for individuals in bad health. Regarding the exclusion restrictions,
they are all significant and with the expected signs. Individuals are significantly less likely
to be in the career job after crossing the Social Security ages. Those whose wealth in the
current period is above lifetime wealth are more likely to be (semi-)retired, while those
who have an outstanding mortgage are more likely to remain in the career job. Having
an employer-provided insurance plan that covers their wife increases men’s incentives to
remain in the career job. Finally, low-education men whose wife is above age 62 are less
likely to remain in the career job. Regarding the variables proxying the time-constant
unobserved component, we can see that the lower the level of health across the sample
period, the less likely an individual is to remain in the career work. Higher lifetime
wealth is associated with a higher probability of being (semi-)retired for those with high
education only. Within the low education category, having graduated from high-school
rises the likelihood of (semi-)retirement with respect to high-school dropouts, while those
with more educated mothers are more likely to remain in the career job.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 3.3 show results for highly-educated men who had a de-
fined benefit (DB) pension and a defined contribution (DC) pension in the career job,
respectively.13 It is clear that the declining age trend in the participation of career work-
13Due to the low number of men in jobs with no pensions who work at older ages, the coefficients of
the wage equation are estimated very imprecisely for this subsample of workers. Moreover, this category
combines two heterogeneous groups of workers, those who had low-attachment to the labor force during
their working careers and the self-employed, which makes the results difficult to interpret. For these reasons,
results for the no-pension category are not reported here, although they are shown in the appendix.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of selection equation by education and pension type.
High Education Low Education
All DB DC All DB DC
age52 -0.217 -0.756* -0.438 -0.184 -0.398 0.334
(0.149) (0.351) (0.345) (0.121) (0.297) (0.354)
age53 -0.080 -0.422 -0.331 -0.074 -0.343 0.092
(0.142) (0.346) (0.346) (0.112) (0.283) (0.286)
age54 -0.288* -0.872** -0.448 -0.117 -0.228 0.431
(0.138) (0.334) (0.339) (0.113) (0.286) (0.320)
age55 -0.362** -0.735* -0.533 -0.180 -0.265 -0.039
(0.136) (0.330) (0.342) (0.110) (0.279) (0.281)
age56 -0.507** -0.987** -0.339 -0.156 -0.321 0.245
(0.134) (0.328) (0.333) (0.110) (0.275) (0.312)
age57 -0.438** -0.914** -0.327 -0.252* -0.562* 0.208
(0.136) (0.330) (0.338) (0.111) (0.274) (0.290)
age58 -0.548** -1.051** -0.497 -0.211 -0.431 0.422
(0.141) (0.335) (0.344) (0.117) (0.283) (0.317)
age59 -0.681** -1.198** -0.772* -0.371** -0.662* 0.152
(0.143) (0.336) (0.349) (0.118) (0.283) (0.308)
age60 -0.712** -1.255** -0.609 -0.325** -0.577* 0.071
(0.147) (0.341) (0.354) (0.121) (0.287) (0.316)
age61 -0.835** -1.379** -0.826* -0.539** -0.857** -0.176
(0.148) (0.341) (0.355) (0.124) (0.291) (0.318)
age62 0.086 0.041 0.416*
(0.096) (0.148) (0.172)
age63 0.029 -0.027 -0.072 -0.074 -0.003 0.121
(0.094) (0.145) (0.163) (0.083) (0.136) (0.163)
age64 -0.156 -0.229** -0.182
(0.175) (0.089) (0.143)
age65 0.072 0.022 0.118 0.243* 0.354* 0.199
(0.111) (0.191) (0.205) (0.114) (0.177) (0.235)
age66 -0.107 0.072 -0.010 0.271
(0.208) (0.212) (0.121) (0.227)
age67 0.007 0.147
(0.124) (0.202)
bad he -0.231** -0.269* -0.206 -0.277** -0.261** -0.210
(0.073) (0.130) (0.145) (0.047) (0.092) (0.110)
overERA -1.165** -1.786** -1.058** -0.849** -1.344** -0.942**
(0.160) (0.355) (0.360) (0.129) (0.296) (0.339)
overFRA -0.350** -0.397* -0.583** -0.543** -0.525** -0.540*
(0.110) (0.192) (0.221) (0.123) (0.188) (0.231)
wealth -0.001* -0.002 -0.001 -0.003** -0.007** -0.005*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
mortg 0.284** 0.228** 0.363** 0.214** 0.126* 0.169*
(0.033) (0.054) (0.066) (0.030) (0.052) (0.070)
wife62 -0.253** -0.248** -0.137
(0.049) (0.084) (0.103)
ins 0.447** 0.404** 0.403** 0.482** 0.370** 0.505**
(0.035) (0.054) (0.068) (0.032) (0.052) (0.072)
hsch grad -0.168** -0.242** -0.077
(0.032) (0.062) (0.073)
ever self 0.091* -0.317** 0.003 -0.006 -0.165* 0.352**
(0.037) (0.069) (0.070) (0.037) (0.076) (0.102)
bad he (av) -0.746** 0.014 -0.718** -0.954** -0.560** -0.293
(0.098) (0.177) (0.236) (0.066) (0.139) (0.159)
wealth 0 -0.002** -0.000 -0.002** 0.001 0.004** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
mother’s ed -0.030 0.054 -0.125** 0.027* 0.053* -0.001
(0.021) (0.035) (0.044) (0.014) (0.025) (0.032)
constant 0.869** 1.690** 1.614** 0.818** 1.698** 0.967**
(0.128) (0.312) (0.320) (0.099) (0.255) (0.240)
Sample size 7,072 2,998 1,922 9,845 3,318 1,947
NOTE. - Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates signifi-
cance at 1%. All regressions include time dummies.
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ers, which was apparent for the whole sample from the early 50’s, was mostly driven by
workers with a DB pension. For workers with a DC pension participation declines at a
slower rate, and the coefficients of the age variables are not significant until age 59. These
results are consistent with the different pension incentives provided by DB and DC plans.
DB plans usually establish an early and a normal retirement age, after which pension
accrual decreases considerably and in some cases becomes negative. While 62 the median
normal retirement age in DB plans (French (2005)), it is common for them to have early
retirement ages as early as 50 or 55. In DC plans, on the other hand, pension accrual is
determined by the amount that worker and employer contribute to the account each year,
and is independent on the individual’s age. The only age-related restriction in DC plans
that is relevant for this analysis is that the balance in these accounts cannot be accessed
without penalty before age 59 and a half. This explains why DC-pension holders do not
significantly increase their entrance into semi-retirement until after this age.
The coefficients on the exclusion restrictions are comparable across the two pension
plans. There are some differences regarding the proxies for the unobserved individual
effects. Having been self-employed lowers the likelihood of being in the career job for DB
but not DC-plan holders, while a low value of average health during the period increases
the likelihood of (semi-)retirement for those with a DC pension, but not for those with a
DB plan.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 of table 3.3 show results for low education men disaggregated
by pension type. The main difference with respect to their highly-educated counterparts
is that evidence of a decline in participation in the career job with age is less conclusive
and generally insignificant. Having a wife above ERA increases (semi-)retirement of DB-
pension holders but not for those with a DC plan. And the increased likelihood of being
(semi-)retired for those who have completed high-school vs. high-school dropouts is only
significant for individuals with a DB pension.
3.6.3 Wage equation
We use the coefficients from the selection equations to construct category-specific inverse
Mills ratios, and then estimate equation 3.5. The results are reported in table 3.2. The
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coefficients on the age dummies, which identify the age profile of log-hourly wages and
those of the inverse Mills ratios are described separately in the following section. Here we
summarize the results for the vectors of coefficients β and Π.
Table 3.2: Estimates of wage equation by education and pension type.
High Education Low Education
All DB DC All DB DC
age52 -0.031 0.080 -0.222 0.151** 0.111 0.092
(0.065) (0.062) (0.116) (0.059) (0.058) (0.089)
age53 -0.041 -0.009 -0.014 0.060 0.038 0.093
(0.048) (0.045) (0.110) (0.044) (0.046) (0.067)
age54 -0.025 0.045 -0.195 0.106 0.100 0.095
(0.063) (0.064) (0.120) (0.055) (0.059) (0.090)
age55 0.021 -0.002 -0.063 0.065 0.013 0.075
(0.061) (0.058) (0.122) (0.052) (0.054) (0.079)
age56 0.071 0.120 -0.235 0.064 0.028 0.111
(0.071) (0.074) (0.125) (0.057) (0.059) (0.096)
age57 0.023 0.064 -0.178 0.109 0.058 0.049
(0.070) (0.073) (0.131) (0.060) (0.067) (0.088)
age58 -0.000 0.039 -0.210 0.097 0.081 0.052
(0.081) (0.089) (0.146) (0.067) (0.072) (0.109)
age59 0.061 0.075 -0.027 0.080 0.013 0.032
(0.091) (0.101) (0.173) (0.074) (0.085) (0.103)
age60 0.062 0.118 -0.197 0.102 0.088 0.060
(0.100) (0.119) (0.175) (0.080) (0.088) (0.125)
age61 0.114 0.131 -0.115 0.107 0.025 0.050
(0.112) (0.123) (0.198) (0.093) (0.111) (0.126)
age62 0.160 0.297 -0.197 0.287** 0.156 0.228
(0.136) (0.163) (0.226) (0.108) (0.161) (0.146)
age63 0.250 0.286 -0.051 0.315* 0.171 0.370*
(0.145) (0.181) (0.250) (0.123) (0.172) (0.170)
age64 0.191 0.237 -0.212 0.426** 0.204 0.398*
(0.159) (0.194) (0.272) (0.139) (0.202) (0.191)
age65 0.359 0.432 -0.127 0.535** 0.217 0.558*
(0.196) (0.248) (0.335) (0.157) (0.231) (0.222)
age66 0.358 0.436 -0.112 0.617** 0.332 0.431*
(0.218) (0.309) (0.352) (0.173) (0.283) (0.217)
age67 0.403 0.252 -0.083 0.760** 0.379 0.470
(0.229) (0.295) (0.407) (0.192) (0.298) (0.266)
bad he 0.128** 0.084 0.082 0.134** 0.072 0.024
(0.046) (0.060) (0.083) (0.033) (0.042) (0.041)
hsch grad 0.227** 0.193** 0.160**
(0.033) (0.041) (0.048)
ever self -0.075 0.066 0.086 -0.051 -0.087 -0.096
(0.047) (0.072) (0.083) 0.043) (0.051) (0.062)
bad he (av) -0.126 -0.244* -0.334 0.185* -0.084 0.053
(0.105) (0.106) (0.219) (0.079) (0.086) (0.091)
wealth 0 0.004** 0.004** 0.006** 0.001 0.000 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
mother’s ed 0.070** 0.085** 0.063 0.043** 0.026 0.020
(0.026) (0.032) (0.049) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
Inverse Mills -0.694** -0.445** -0.621** -0.664** -0.219 -0.534**
(0.120) (0.156) (0.215) (0.092) (0.181) (0.145)
constant 2.845** 2.699** 2.795** 2.331** 2.389** 2.278**
(0.086) (0.096) (0.162) (0.059) (0.070) (0.091)
Sample size 3,371 1,625 1,110 4,135 1,784 1,196
R2 0.1577 0.1308 0.2418 0.1724 0.1089 0.1404
NOTE. - Standard errors (in parentheses) obtained from 2,500 bootstrap replications, accounting
for estimation of inverse Mills ratios in first stage. * indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates
significance at 1%. All regressions include time dummies.
The vector Xit minus the exclusion restrictions includes an indicator of whether the
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individual is in bad health in the current period. For the whole samples of men with col-
lege education and those who have graduated from high-school or are high-school dropouts
(columns 1 and 4, respectively), the coefficient is positive and significant. This results is
puzzling, as it would imply that being in bad health somehow increases a worker’s pro-
ductivity. Once we disaggregate by pension type, however, the coefficient on this variable
becomes small and insignificant, suggesting that the positive sign was a spurious result of
the combination of the different subsamples. Regarding the variables from the lineariza-
tion of the unobserved individual-specific effects, higher lifetime wealth is associated with
higher wages for those with high education, but is insignificant for the low-education group.
Having a more educated mother, which is intended to proxy the individual’s ability, is as-
sociated to higher wages for both education groups. Within the low education category,
not surprisingly, we find that high-school graduates have higher wages than high-school
dropouts.
3.6.4 The age-wage profile
This section describes the estimated age profiles, identified by the coefficients on the age
dummies in the wage equation. We show that after controlling for selection there is no
evidence of a declining wage profile for any of the categories considered. The results are
illustrated in figure 3.7, which shows the series of mean observed wages at every age (the
observed age-profile), against the series of predicted wages at every age, after controlling
for selection (the true age profile), and the associated 95% confidence interval. The graphs
on the left of the figure show result for men with high education, and those on the right for
men with low education. The first row corresponds to the regressions for the whole sample
within each education category, while the other two show results for the subsamples of
individuals who have a DB and a DC pension, respectively.
We can see that for all groups represented in figure 3.7 the true wage profile lies
above the observed one, and the difference between the two increases with age. This is
suggestive of negative selection, whereby those workers with low values for the unobserved
determinants of the decision to remain in the career job (e.g. those with a strong taste
for (semi-)retirement) tend to have a higher unobserved component of wages. The results
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in table 3.2 confirm that the sample of career workers is indeed negatively selected. The
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is negative for all groups, and it is significant at 1%
in all subsamples except for low-education workers with a DB pension.
After controlling for selection, there is no statistical evidence of a decreasing age-wage
profile for any of the education-and-pension categories. Most age-wage profiles actually
appear to increase with age, even though the age dummies are only significant for individ-
uals with low education when we pool all pension categories together. When low educated
individuals with DB and DC pensions are considered separately, the coefficients on the
age dummies are never statistically significant.
To summarize, we can reject declines in log hourly wages at every age before 67 for all
the subsamples analyzed. Our results indicate that the negative trend observed in cross-
sectional data is partly due to negative selection that stems from individuals with higher
potential wages (after controlling for observables) tending to retire earlier; and partly due
to composition effects that arise when pooling all the pension categories together.
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Figure 3.7: Observed vs. Predicted Wage Profiles by Education and Pension Type
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3.7 Conclusions
This chapter addresses the question of whether the declines in wages at older ages that have
been described in previous papers set in while individuals are in the career job or only
after they enter (semi-)retirement. We estimate separate wage regressions for different
subsamples of career workers, defined according to their educational level and type of
employer-provided pension. In each case, we control for self-selection out of the career
job. For none of the categories considered do we find statistical evidence of a declining
age-wage profile. We conclude that wage declines at older ages observed in cross-sectional
data are explained partly by selection on unobservables (as workers with higher potential
wages tend to retire earlier than those with lower ones), and partly by compositional
effects resulting from workers with different pension types, and hence different average
wages, retiring at different ages.
Our results are consistent with Lazear’s model of deferred compensation and the forced-
savings hypothesis. They are not inconsistent with the human capital model, but imply
that any wage adjustments to accommodate declines in productivity, if present, happen
only when worker enters the the retirement phase.
With regards to policy analysis, our results are key to the evaluation of policies aimed
at raising the return to work at older ages. Several policy changes with this stated objective
were introduced by the Social Security Administration in the last decade. Their aim is to
keep individuals employed for longer, which would reduce the overall amount of benefits
they draw from the system during their lifetimes, and hence contribute to its fiscal balance
in the upcoming decades. The effectiveness of such policies depends on the incentives for
individuals to remain on the job. Clearly, if they expect a declining wage profile, much
stronger incentives from the Social Security will be needed to persuade them to remain
on the job. Our findings are good news for the Social Security system, as they imply that
wages will not decline for workers who choose to remain on the career job.
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3.8 Appendix 2.A.Tables
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Men: High Education
All None DB DC
GH BH GH BH GH BH GH BH
Working full-time 0.51 0.25 0.31 0.13 0.55 0.38 0.59 0.35
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Full-time wage 2.88 2.61 2.45 2.25 2.96 2.78 2.93 2.63
(0.000) (0.162) (0.021) (0.059)
Age 59.31 60.40 59.59 59.93 59.12 60.71 59.32 60.89
(0.000) (0.213) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.86 0.79 0.79 0.73 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.84
(0.010) (0.181) (0.673) (0.429)
Ever self-employed 0.35 0.29 0.55 0.36 0.22 0.17 0.40 0.35
(0.174) (0.002) (0.435) (0.669)
Average bad health 0.06 0.60 0.11 0.69 0.05 0.55 0.05 0.45
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Initial Wealth 30.89 20.65 38.74 14.39 22.42 22.29 38.11 34.62
(0.028) (0.000) (0.981) (0.823)
Mother’s education 2.57 2.28 2.50 2.32 2.58 2.22 2.62 2.32
(0.000) (0.112) (0.002) (0.048)
N 6,104 968 1,456 480 2,697 301 1,749 173
Men: Low Education
All None DB DC
GH BH GH BH GH BH GH BH
Working full-time 0.51 0.22 0.34 0.11 0.58 0.36 0.65 0.47
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Full-time wage 2.41 2.27 2.12 1.93 2.56 2.49 2.41 2.35
(0.000) (0.004) (0.185) (0.249)
Age 59.26 59.91 59.36 59.61 59.16 60.37 59.28 60.51
(0.000) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.72 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.79
(0.000) (0.006) (0.546) (0.284)
Finished high-school 0.67 0.46 0.58 0.41 0.74 0.54 0.66 0.52
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027)
Ever self-employed 0.25 0.16 0.42 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.11
(0.000) (0.000) (0.246) (0.244)
Average bad health 0.14 0.71 0.18 0.77 0.10 0.58 0.12 0.60
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Initial Wealth 14.90 7.75 16.91 7.03 14.81 8.91 12.43 9.27
(0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.246)
Mother’s education 1.98 1.62 1.84 1.49 2.15 1.85 1.91 1.84
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.620)
N 6,685 3,160 2,391 2,011 2,644 674 1,506 441
NOTE. - p-values (in parentheses) for null hypothesis that means are the same across health status.
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Table 3.4: Estimates of selection equation for no-pension category
High Education Low Education
age52 0.576* -0.186
(0.279) (0.177)
age53 0.369 0.008
(0.284) (0.166)
age54 0.580* -0.037
(0.261) (0.165)
age55 0.323 -0.104
(0.253) (0.164)
age56 0.239 0.039
(0.251) (0.163)
age57 0.436 -0.027
(0.253) (0.166)
age58 0.593* -0.070
(0.267) (0.177)
age59 0.622* -0.157
(0.272) (0.180)
age60 0.652* 0.005
(0.282) (0.186)
age61 0.495 -0.135
(0.291) (0.190)
age62 -0.016 0.067
(0.199) (0.147)
age63 0.061 0.003
(0.200) (0.142)
age64
age65 0.095 0.373*
(0.248) (0.178)
age66 -0.100
(0.270)
age67 0.136
(0.202)
bad he -0.249 -0.282*
(0.132) (0.072)
overERA 0.629* -0.303
(0.318) (0.215)
overFRA -0.127 -0.363
(0.242) (0.186)
wealth -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
mortg 0.052 0.176**
(0.067) (0.048)
wife62 -0.213**
(0.075)
ins 0.110 -0.080
(0.093) (0.074)
hsch grad -0.233**
(0.049)
ever self 1.066** 0.285**
(0.076) (0.051)
bad he (av) -0.551** -0.937**
(0.169) (0.099)
wealth 0 -0.004** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
mother’s ed -0.048 -0.028
(0.038) (0.021)
constant -0.680** 0.371*
(0.245) (0.149)
Sample size 1,936 4,402
NOTE. - Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates sig-
nificance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 1%. All regressions
include time dummies.
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Table 3.5: Estimates of wage equation for no-pension category
High Education Low Education
age52 -0.472 0.061
(0.366) (0.144)
age53 -0.450 0.093
(0.274) (0.112)
age54 -0.454 0.093
(0.358) (0.120)
age55 -0.263 -0.046
(0.269) (0.118)
age56 -0.088 0.081
(0.257) (0.131)
age57 -0.394 0.114
(0.315) (0.132)
age58 -0.484 0.037
(0.389) (0.153)
age59 -0.568 -0.071
(0.413) (0.165)
age60 -0.750 0.029
(0.454) (0.176)
age61 -0.401 -0.054
(0.402) (0.183)
age62 -0.741 -0.121
(0.503) (0.236)
age63 -0.594 -0.201
(0.518) (0.244)
age64 -0.789 -0.163
(0.542) (0.291)
age65 -0.583 -0.130
(0.539) (0.305)
age66 -0.421 -0.345
(0.536) (0.445)
age67 -0.060 -0.005
(0.671) (0.440)
bad he 0.234 -0.131
(0.186) (0.136)
hsch grad -0.070
(0.125)
ever self -0.878 0.250
(0.598) (0.145)
bad he (av) 0.248 -0.516
(0.348) (0.395)
wealth 0 0.006* 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
mother’s ed 0.080 0.101**
(0.065) (0.032)
Inverse Mills -1.408 0.472
(0.769) (0.571)
constant 4.011** 1.571**
(1.027) (0.341)
Sample size 522 1,062
R2 0.1273 0.1510
NOTE. - Standard errors (in parentheses) obtained from 2,500
bootstrap replications, accounting for estimation of inverse Mills
ratio in first stage. * indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates
significance at 1%. All regressions include time dummies.
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Chapter 4
Happy Together: A Structural
Model of Couples’
Joint Retirement Choices
82
4.1 Introduction
With the first baby-boomers reaching retirement age in 2010, a massive increase in US
old-age population will be taking place during the next decade. Even under the most
optimistic assumptions regarding future birth rates and immigration, a sharp rise is pro-
jected in the share of GDP devoted to Social Security and Medicare.1 Different policies
have been suggested in order to alleviate the budgetary burden, some of which, such as
the progressive increase of normal retirement age up to 67 years of age, are already taking
place. In this context, it is crucial that we understand how savings and employment deci-
sions respond to changes in incentives during the years around retirement age. This will
allow understanding and predicting the effects of policy changes and, more importantly,
measuring the effects on old age well-being.
Most existing retirement models study the behavior of individuals -usually men. Many
of these studies2 analyze retirement within the framework of a structural model. A struc-
tural approach is particularly suited to the analysis of retirement decisions, given the
complex financial incentives facing workers at the end of their careers. It is hard to sum-
marize the high nonlinearity of pension accrual with age, for instance, in a measure that
can be used in a reduced-form framework. Moreover, a structural approach captures the
sequential nature of work and saving decisions, which are adjusted over time following
the realizations of uncertain events. Uncertainty plays an increasing role at older ages,
when the incidence of negative shocks to health, out of pocket medical expenditures, and
survival is much larger than when individuals are young. Finally, the estimation of struc-
tural parameters allows to carry out counterfactual policy experiments, such as forecasting
the impact of changes in social security rules on the retirement choices and wellbeing of
workers affected by those changes.
A crucial fact about individuals approaching retirement is that the majority of them
are married. According to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, 78% of men
aged 55 to 64 in 1992 were married or living with a partner. Structural models of men’s
1Congressional Budget Office (CBO) “The Long-Term Budget Outlook 2009”
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 102xx/doc10297/06-25-LTBO.pdf
2Gustmand and Steinmeier (1986), Blau (1994 and 2008), Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2005) and
French and Jones (2007).
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retirement have traditionally taken their wives’ income as exogenous, and have ignored the
wives’ participation decision. While this may have been an appropriate approximation of
reality in a time when the majority of women did not work, those strong restrictions are
no longer valid. The typical household approaching retirement today is one where both
husband and wife are employed. In the HRS, 70% of married men aged 55 to 64 in 1992
and 58% of their wives were working.
In the last 10 years we have seen the first structural models of couples’ retirement
decisions. These models acknowledge the role of both husband and wife as separate
decision-making agents within the household, and represent each spouse’s preferences with
a separate utility function. The models of couples’ retirement can be broadly divided in
two groups. In the first group, models such as Blau and Gilleskie (2006) and Van der
Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) concentrate on carefully modeling the environment in which
couples make decisions and its effect on husbands and wives’ choices through the shared
budget constraint. Both these papers include a detailed specification of the social secu-
rity rules, the rules associated to different types of health insurance coverage, and the
stochastic processes for wages, health, and survival. Van der Klaauw and Wolpin also
incorporate savings with limited borrowing and unobserved heterogeneity. Accounting for
the presence of both husband and wife in the household improves in several respects on
previous papers that also modeled carefully the environment in which men make decisions
but abstracted from their wives’ role (such as Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2005) and
French and Jones (2007)). On the one hand, these papers have something to say about
the behavior of women, and can study how they respond to their own incentives. On the
other hand, they can more accurately model the household budget constraint: because
both husband and wife provide income and share household wealth, they can potentially
insure each other against shocks to wages, health, or medical expenditures. A model that
does not consider the presence of a working wife may overestimate the risk facing men.
Moreover, the social security spousal benefit implies that men whose wife qualifies for this
program can substitute their wage upon retirement for up to 150% the amount of pension
they would have otherwise received. Once, again a model where the participation status
of the wife is not considered may underestimate these men’s incentives to retirement.
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The other group of models dealing with couples’ retirement stems from the observation
that a significant number of spouses retire within less than a year from each other, in-
dependently of the age difference between them3. The study of this phenomenon, known
as joint retirement, led to a series of reduced-form studies (Coile (1999) and Banks et
al. (2010)) that showed that the proportion of spouses retiring together is larger than
financial incentives alone can explain, and suggested the existence of complementarities in
spouses’ preferences. In particular, if spouses enjoy spending time together, it is possible
that they derive a higher value from being retired when their partner is retired too. This
complementarity in leisure would give spouses incentives to coordinate their retirement
decisions.
The main structural papers that have accounted for the role of leisure complemen-
tarities are Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) and Maestas (2001). They find that comple-
mentarities are crucial to explain coordination in spouses’ choices. The main drawback
of these studies is that they make strong simplifying assumptions regarding the financial
and stochastic environment in which individuals make retirement choices. Specifically,
they assume perfect capital markets and no uncertainty. However, studies of individual
retirement have suggested that the existence of credit constraints before individuals be-
come eligible for a Social Security pension may explain the high frequency of retirement
at age 62 (Rust and Phelan (1997)); and they have shown the crucial role that uncertainty
regarding future income, health costs, and survival plays in determining individual retire-
ment outcomes (Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2005), French and Jones (2007), De
Nardi et al. (2009 and 2010)). It is not clear a priori how these simplifying assumptions
on the factors that determine individual retirements interact with the estimation of the
complementarity parameters. In the presence of correlation of shocks across spouses, for
instance, they may lead to overestimation of its magnitude.
This chapter aims to bridge the gap between the two strands of the literature on
couples’ retirement by estimating the effect of leisure complementarities on spouses’ re-
tirement timing within a rich dynamic model of participation and saving decisions that
3Evidence of joint retirement of US couples is found in the New Beneficiary Survey (Hurd (1990a)),
the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (Gustman and Steinmeier (2000)), the Retirement
History Study (Blau (1998)) and the Health and Retirement Study (Michaud (2003)). Banks, et al. (2010)
find evidence of joint retirement of couples from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing.
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carefully accounts for the main financial incentives and sources of uncertainty facing older
couples. The model includes a detailed specification of the social security rules, allows
for limited borrowing, and accounts for uncertainty in future wage income, out of pocket
medical expenditures, and survival. Each spouse’s preferences are represented by their
own utility function, and the substitutability between consumption and leisure is not con-
strained to being equal for husband and wife. Individuals within and across couples are
heterogeneous in the persistent component of their wage offers, which is estimated from
the data. In order to capture leisure complementarities, each spouse’s utility is allowed to
depend on the partner’s participation status.
The model is estimated using a subsample of older individuals from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). Estimation results show that leisure complementarities are pos-
itive and significant, and account for up to 8 percent of observed joint retirements. The
social security spousal benefit is found to account for an extra 13 percent of them. These
results imply that incentives for joint retirement play a crucial role in determining individ-
ual choices. Since these incentives cannot be captured in a model that takes one spouse’s
behavior as exogenous, this suggests that individual models of retirement are no longer
an appropriate approximation of the average household’s behavior, given the increasing
number of working couples approaching retirement age.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 presents an overview of the
main incentives to retirement facing individuals and couples, and how these are captured
in the theoretical model. Section 4.3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4.4 reviews
the procedure used to solve and estimate a stochastic, dynamic, Markov process with
both discrete and continuous controls. Estimation results for the laws of motion of the
exogenous variables are presented in section 4.5, and for the preference parameters in
section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Overview
The objective of this chapter is to disentangle the role of financial incentives versus leisure
complementarities in explaining joint retirements, that is, the observed tendency of spouses
to retire within a short time from each other. In order to do this, I develop and estimate
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a structural model of couples’ saving and retirement choices.
So as to accurately measure the share of joint retirements occurring in response to
financial incentives, the model must replicate in a precise way the environment in which
couples make participation and saving decisions. This section describes this institutional
environment, which agents are assumed to take as given. It discusses the main incentives
the regulatory environment gives for individuals to retire at specific ages and for couples
to retire together. The section also explains how this environment leads to the choice of
estimation sample.
4.2.1 Incentives to retirement from the individual perspective
One of the most important predictions of the life-cycle model is that households will
accumulate assets through their working life in order to finance retirement. Given that
the interest of this study is in older couples, we would expect most of them to have
accumulated a significant amount of wealth by the time they are first observed, already in
their fifties. Nevertheless, 55% of the couples interviewed in the first survey wave report a
net value of financial wealth -which excludes housing wealth- of less than $10,000. Unless
all these couples intend to use their primary residence to finance their retirement, it would
seem that their savings are far too low to support them into old age. Financial savings,
however, are only one of the several possible ways to finance retirement. The role of
alternative sources of retirement funds, and the incentives for retirement at particular
ages provided by each of them, is considered below.
Social Security
Social Security benefits represent a source of retirement income for most of the older
population. In 2005, 90% of individuals aged over 65 received benefits from the Social
Security, and for 65% of elderly households these benefits represented more than half their
income4.
Figure 4.3 in appendix 3.D shows the distribution of retirement ages for men and
women between ages 51 and 70. The spikes in retirements at ages 62 and 65, which have
been extensively documented in the literature, are noticeable for both genders. Part of the
4Social Security Administration. ”Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2007”
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast facts/2007/fast facts07.pdf
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explanation for these spikes has been attributed to the Social Security rules, explained in
detail in section 4.3.7 (Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Rust and Phelan (1997), French
(2005)).
The Social Security rules are carefully captured in the theoretical model in section 4.3.
So as to simplify the dynamic program, however, the decision to apply for Social Security
benefits is not considered explicitly. Instead, it is assumed that individuals start claiming
the first year they are observed out of work after age 62. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 in appendix
3.D use the Social Security records of HRS respondents to compare the actual claiming
age with the one assumed in the model. The two series are very close for men. For women,
the assumed Social Security claiming date overpredicts the peak at age 625. On the whole,
however, the approximation seems quite reasonable.
Private Pensions
An important source of incentives to retirement are private pensions. In particular,
defined benefit (DB) pensions give strong incentives to retirement at specific ages: after
a certain number of years of service in a firm, or past the early or normal retirement
ages, the rate of pension accrual is greatly reduced and can even become negative. For
a large proportion of DB pension holders, these incentives are likely to dominate those
provided by Social Security provisions (Lumsdaine et al. (1994)). Benefits from defined
contribution (DC) pensions, on the other hand, are typically determined only by the
amount of assets accumulated in the plan at the time of retirement, and they provide no
specific incentives that encourage or discourage retirement at specific ages (Lumsdaine et
al. (1996)). Nevertheless, most DC pensions, such as 401(k) plans or IRAs, specify an
earliest withdrawal age. Withdrawing benefits from the plan before this age is strongly
penalized. This may lead liquidity-constrained individuals to remain in work while their
money is locked up in their DC pension plan.
Figure 4.7 in appendix 3.D shows retirement frequencies as a function of age for men
with different pension types. It is clear that DB pension holders are much more likely than
DC ones to retire before the Social Security incentives kick in at age 62. Moreover, part
5The discrepancy is mainly due to a significant proportion of women who start receiving benefits before
the age of 62. It is possible for a non-disabled woman to claim benefits at age 60 or before in exceptional
circumstances. She should be a widow who has not remarried or taking care of young children.
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of the exit frequencies at ages 62 and 65 for individuals with a DB pension are likely to
be due to their pension plan’s characteristics, rather than Social Security provisions: the
most common ages in the distribution of normal retirement ages for DB pension holders
are 65 and 62, followed by 55, and the rest distributed between 56 and 60. The most
common early retirement ages are 62 and 55 (Karoly et al. (2007)).
The tendency of DB pension holders to retire early is confirmed by table 4.4 in appendix
3.E, which shows descriptive statistics for men and women group by their type of pension
coverage: Men who have a DB pension plan are 17 percentage points less likely than DC
plan holders to be employed by the time they become entitled to Social Security benefits
at age 62.
Figure 4.8 in appendix 3.D shows retirement frequencies for women, by pension type.
Even though the difference is not so noticeable as for men, DB pension holders are still
more likely to retire before the age of early Social Security entitlement than DC pension
holders. According to table 4.4, women who have a DB pension plan are 6 percentage
points more likely than those who have a DC pension plan to have retired by the time
they become 62.
Introducing private pension incentives into a dynamic model implies adding a sufficient
number of state variables to describe pension characteristics. In the case of DB pensions,
these variables would have to include the early and/or normal retirement age, a measure
of job tenure, and the wage. In a model of couples such as the one presented in section
4.3, separate state variables would have to be added for men and women, and this would
render the programme computationally intractable.
Ignoring the role of DB pensions, on the other hand, would disregard an important
retirement incentive. Using the sample of DB pension holders to estimate a model that
does not account for DB provisions would create problems in fitting the behavior of those
who retire before age 60 upon reaching their plan’s early retirement age -and in the absence
of any health, health cost or wage shock. Moreover, the model would likely attribute
to Social Security incentives the retirement exits of individuals whose DB-plan early or
normal retirement ages are 62 and 65.
In order to maintain a computationally-tractable number of state variables while still
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accounting for the main incentives to retirement of the individuals in the sample, I restrict
the estimation sample to couples with no private pension or one or more DC plans. DC
pension holdings are treated in the model as part of household wealth. While this can be
a reasonable approximation for non-liquidity constrained individuals, it is possible that
a minority of DC pension holders who would have otherwise retired may be obliged to
remain in work until the earliest age at which their DC pension funds become available.
The high participation rates of men past age 59 suggest that this is not likely to be an
issue, while very few women in the sample have a substantial amount of assets in a DC
plan.
A more important concern is the special tax treatment of DC plans. Most DC pension
plans allow workers to defer income taxes on plan contributions until withdrawal. The
tax-deferred nature of DC-plans is not accounted for in the model, which may lead to the
corresponding increase in couples’ willingness to save being wrongly attributed to other
causes. This will be less of a problem to the extent that the incentives to save in a 401(k)
crowd out rather than build on top of other types of savings.
Couples with no private pension and those where one or both of the spouses have a DC
pension are considered together in the estimation sample in order to attain a reasonable
sample size. It is important, though, to bear in mind that individuals who have no
private pension have quite different characteristics from those with a DC plan. Table
4.4 in appendix 3.E shows that they tend to belong to poorer households, have worse
health, less education and lower wages. The key assumption that allows to model these
two groups together is that none of them face incentives from a pension plan to retire at
particular ages. The model in section 4.3 is rich enough to account for other observable
and unobservable differences between the two: differences in health, wages and household
wealth are captured through the initial conditions for these variables. Part of the effect of
education and unobservable characteristics such as ability is captured through the initial
draw for the wage error term and the initial value of wealth.
Health Insurance
A source of incentives to retirement often considered in the literature is the type of
health insurance coverage. Gustman and Steinmeier (1994), Rust and Phelan (1997), Blau
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and Gilleskie (2006), French and Jones (2007), and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)
distinguish three types of individuals according to the type of health insurance coverage:
those whose health insurance is tied to their job, and would lose their coverage if they
retired -i.e. individuals with “tied” coverage-; those who can keep their health insurance
even if they retire from their job before age 65 -individuals with “retiree” coverage-;
and those with no work-related health insurance. They argue that individuals with tied
coverage will have stronger incentives to remain in work until they become eligible for
government-provided Medicare coverage at 65 than those with retiree or no coverage.
Gustman and Steinmeier and Blau and Gilleskie find that the effect of health insurance
on retirement behavior is small. Rust and Phelan find that the effect is large for the
subsample of individuals without a private pension. However, their model ignores the
role of savings as insurance against medical shocks, and is thus likely to overestimate the
importance of health insurance. Finally, French and Jones estimate a dynamic model with
savings and participation decisions using the HRS data and find that individuals whose
health insurance is tied to the job leave the labor force on average half a year later than
workers with retiree coverage.
None of these studies models explicitly the relationship between health insurance and
pension type. However, it can be seen from table 4.4 that there is a correlation between
the two: individuals with no pension are the most likely to have no health insurance;
individuals with a DB pension plan are the most likely to have retiree coverage; and
individuals with DC pension plans are the most likely to have tied coverage. In their
paper, French and Jones acknowledge this correlation, but do not control separately for
health insurance and pension type. Instead, given that people with retiree coverage are
the most likely to have a DB plan, French and Jones assign to them the sharpest drops
in pension accrual after age 59. In this way, they compound the effect of health insurance
and pension type, and thus it is not clear what part of the later retirements of people with
tied coverage is due to the type of health insurance, and what part is due to them being
more likely to have a DC pension (which offers no incentives for early retirement, unlike
the usual DB plan).
In the absence of a model that explicitly accounts for pension type, I choose not to
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control for health insurance type either. I therefore ignore any incentives that individuals
with tied coverage may have to remain in work for longer than the rest. The estimate
of French and Jones that those with retiree coverage and a DB pension retire half a year
earlier than those with tied coverage and a DC pension is likely to be an upper bound on
the effect of health insurance for individuals in my estimation sample, given that I drop
all observations with a DB pension plan.
4.2.2 Incentives to retirement from the couple’s perspective
A growing share of the retirement literature characterizes retirement as a decision con-
cerning the couple, rather than the individual (Gustman and Steinmeier(2004), Blau and
Gilleskie (2004), Coile (2004a, 2004b), Michaud (2003), Michaud and Vermeulen (2004)).
This follows the observation that a significant share of spouses retire within less than
one year of each other, independently of the age difference between them. Evidence of
this phenomenon, known as joint retirement, has been found in surveys dealing with cou-
ples from several generations and countries, such as the New Beneficiary Survey (Hurd
(1990a)), the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (Gustman and Steinmeier
(2000)), the Retirement History Study (Blau (1998)), the Health and Retirement Study
(Michaud (2003)), and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (Banks, Blundell and
Casanova (2007)).
Figure 7 shows the distribution of differences in retirement dates6 for HRS couples
whose members have retired by the year 2006. The sample used to draw each graph
is selected according to the age difference between spouses.7 The first graph shows the
distribution of retirement date differences for couples where the husband is at least one
year younger than the wife; the second graph shows couples where the husband is the
same age as the wife; and so on. In all of the 6 graphs, the highest frequency corresponds
to a retirement date difference of zero, that is, to spouses retiring on the same calendar
year.
There are two main channels that link spouses’ retirement decisions.8 The first one
6The difference in retirement dates is defined as the husband’s retirement date minus the wife’s re-
tirement date. Hence positive values indicate that the husband retired at a later calendar date than the
wife.
7Age difference is defined as age of the husband minus age of the wife.
8A third potential cause of joint retirement that has been proposed in the literature is a correlation in
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operates through the household budget constraint, and the second one comes directly
from the preferences. The fact that spouses share resources through the household budget
constraint can sometimes increase but also decrease the distance between their retirements.
Consider, for instance, a couple of the same age where the husband intends to retire at
age 65 and the wife intends to retire at age 62. A negative shock to the husband’s
wage the year his wife becomes 62 may lead her to keep working for one more year in
order to compensate the decrease in total household income. This would result in both
spouses retiring closer together. For a similar couple, the wife’s retirement at 62, with the
corresponding replacement of her wage by a (in almost every case) lower pension, would
have an income effect on the husband, who may decide to work for one more year -hence
increasing the distance between their retirement dates.
The Social Security rules offer some further cross-spouse incentives that also operate
through the budget constraint. The Social Security spousal benefit establishes that the
spouse with lower lifetime earnings -usually the wife- is entitled to the highest between
her own pension and (up to) one half of her husband’s full pension once both of them
are retired. This increases the incentives to retirement for men whose wife qualifies for
the benefit, as they will be replacing their wage with a pension that can be up to 50%
higher than it would have been in the absence of the benefit. Since most wives with low
accumulated earnings -and therefore a small amount of work experience- usually retire
much earlier than their husband, the spousal benefit is likely to be one of the channels
leading spouses to retire close to each other.
The second channel linking retirement decisions operates through the spouses’ pref-
erences: it is possible that husband and wife enjoy spending time together, which would
mean that each one of them derives utility from sharing their retirement with their partner.
This chapter attempts to estimate the effect of leisure complementarities after appro-
spouses’ unobserved taste for leisure. This correlation would increase the number of joint retirements in
couples where husband and wife are the same age. In those cases, sharing a preference for early retirement
would likely lead both husband and wife to stop working as soon as the option becomes financially viable
-usually when qualifying for Social Security benefits at age 62. However, the effect of this correlation would
not necessarily increase joint retirements of couples of different ages. If the husband is, say, 5 years older
than the wife, and both of them want to retire as soon as it becomes financially affordable, the fact that
he is eligible for Social Security benefits 5 years before his wife would likely lead to him retiring earlier
than her. While it is unlikely that varying unobserved tastes for leisure play a large role in determining
joint retirement, they likely remain a determinant of individual retirement timing.
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priately controlling for the effects of financial incentives and uncertainty. The chapter
bridges the gap between two strands of the couples’ retirement literature: the one that
focuses on accurately modeling the budget constraint and stochastic processes (Blau and
Gilleskie (2006), Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)) and the one that underlines the
role of complementarities in leisure (Gustman and Steinmeier (2004), Maestas (2001)).
The empirical results allow to compare the relative role of incentives that operate mainly
through the budget constraint versus leisure complementarities as determinants of the
large number of joint retirement observed in the data.
4.3 Theoretical Model
This section describes a dynamic stochastic model of labor supply and saving choices of
households close to retirement age. Each household consists of two spouses (“husband”
and “wife”) with their own preferences. The model captures the sequential nature of the
decision-making process, with households adjusting their behavior in every period as the
uncertainty regarding spouses’ wages, survival and medical expenditures unfolds.
At each discrete period t, given initial assets and husband and wife’s wages and aver-
age lifetime earnings9, households choose optimal consumption and spouses’ participation
status in order to maximize the expected discounted value of remaining lifetime utility.
Retirement status is defined as a function of the participation decision: a spouse who
chooses not to participate in a period when he is above the social security early retirement
age (ERA) is referred to as “retired”. Retirement is not an absorbing state, as retired
individuals can go back to work in any future period. Spouses’ decisions to apply for social
security benefits are not modeled separately from the participation decision. Individuals
are assumed to start receiving social security pension benefits the first period in which
they choose not to work after ERA. Benefit claiming is an absorbing state: social security
entitlement is determined the first time individuals claim benefits, and it is not possible
for them to accrue more pension in future periods, even if they go back to work.
The agents in the model are married couples who stay married until one or both spouses
die. Decisions of widowed individuals are not explicitly modeled.
9Average lifetime earnings is the main variable used to determine pension entitlement at retirement.
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4.3.1 Choice Set
At each discrete period t, households make both discrete choices -both spouses’ participa-
tion status- and continuous ones -household consumption and savings.
It is useful to formalize the model explicitly separating continuous and discrete choices
assuming, without loss of generality, that households make decisions in two steps: first,
they make the discrete choices, that is, whether each of the spouses will work full time,
part time or not at all. Then, they choose optimal household savings conditional on the
discrete alternative.
Both types of choices are described in detail below. For ease of exposition, I will talk
about the “husband” or “wife”’s choices when referring to household decisions concerning
one of the spouses’ variables, such as his or her hours of work. However, all decisions are
made by the household, which acts as a sole individual who maximizes a unique welfare
function.
Discrete choices
The discrete choice variables are each spouse’s participation. As mentioned above,
non-participation is not an absorbing state, and individuals can always go back to work
after periods of inactivity. Therefore, the variables indicating participation status, P it , can
take on the values FT, PT or 0 in all periods:

P jt = FT if spouse j works full time in period t
P jt = PT if spouse j works part time in period t
P jt = 0 if spouse j does not work in period t
where the superscript j = m, f identifies the spouse, m being the husband or “male”,
and f being the wife or “female”.
Dj is the set of discrete alternatives available to spouse j each period. It is defined as:
Dj = {PT, FT, 0}, for j = m, f,
The set of 9 discrete alternatives available to the household each period isD = Dm×Df .
Elements of D are of the type d = (dm, df ), where dm refers to the husband’s participation
status, and df to the wife’s. For example, dt = (PT, 0) indicates that the husband works
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part time and the wife does not work in period t.
Continuous choices
In each period t, households optimally choose savings, st, conditional on the discrete
action dt.
Ct is the choice set for the continuous control conditional on the discrete alternative dt
and the state spaces zt and εt (described in section 4.3.2 below):
st ∈ Ct(zt, εt; dt) ⊂ R+
4.3.2 State Space
The state space in period t consists of variables that are observed both by the agent
and the econometrician, and variables that are observed by the agent, but not by the
econometrician. The vector of observed state variables is the following:
zt = {At, Emt , Eft , wmt , wft , Bmt−1, Bft−1, agemt , ageft },
where At are household assets at the beginning of period t, E
j
t is a measure of spouse j’s
lifetime accumulated earnings, wjt is spouse j’s hourly wage, B
j
t−1 an indicator of whether
spouse j has started claiming benefits before period t and agejt is spouse j’s age in years.
The unobserved state variables are a vector of utility shocks associated to the discrete
alternative chosen by the household:
εt = {εt(dt)|dt ∈ D},
where εt(dt) affects the utility derived from alternative d at time t. The value of the
vector εt is known by the agent when making decisions in period t.
4.3.3 Preferences
Household utility in period t is defined as the weighted sum of each spouse’s utility plus
an unobserved component, εt(dt), associated to the discrete choice and assumed known
by the household:
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U(dt, st, zt, εt, θ1) = φ um(ct, lmt ) + (1− φ)uf (ct, lft ) + εt(dt), (4.3.1)
where φ represents some household sharing rule assumed constant in time and θ1 is
the vector of preference parameters.
Within-period utility for each spouse, uj , is assumed non-decreasing and twice differ-
entiable in consumption, ct , and own leisure, l
j
t . In the empirical part of the chapter, the
function uj is assumed to take the following form:
uj
(
ct, l
j
t ; zt, θ1
)
=
1
1− ρ
(
ct(dt)α
j
1 ljt (dt)
(1−αj1)
)(1−ρ)
,
where ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and αj1 determines the share of
consumption in spouse j’s utility function.
Individual leisure, ljt , is given by:
ljt = L− hj(djt ) + α2I{djt = 0, dkt = 0}, for j 6= k,
where L is the leisure endowment and hj the number of work hours associated to par-
ticipation status djt (see section 4.5.1). The indicator function multiplying the coefficient
α2 is equal to 1 when both spouses are out of work. This term is intended to capture
the type of leisure complementarities found by Coile (2004a) and Banks et al. (2010),
whereby spouses enjoy their retirement more when their partner is retired too. A posi-
tive (negative) α2 will provide evidence of complementarity (substitutability) in spouses’
leisure.
4.3.4 Budget Constraint
Households receive income from different sources: asset income, rAt; husband’s labor
income, wmt h
m
t ; wife’s labor income, w
f
t h
f
t ; husband and wife’s social security benefits,
ssbmt and ssb
f
t ; and government transfers Tt. Post-tax resources are allocated between
household consumption, ct, and savings, st. The budget constraint can be written as:
97
ct + st = At + Y (rAt, wmt h
m
t , w
f
t h
f
t , τ) +B
m
t × ssbmt +Bwt × ssbft + Tt, (4.3.2)
where Y is the level of post-tax income, r is the interest rate, τ is the tax structure,
wt denotes the hourly wage rate (described in section 4.3.5), ssbt denotes Social Security
benefits (described in section 4.3.7), and Tt are government transfers (described below).
Next period’s assets are determined by subtracting out-of-pocket medical, hct, from
household assets. Hence the asset accumulation equation is:
At+1 = st − hct, (4.3.3)
Households cannot borrow against future labor of Social Security income. This is
reflected in the following borrowing constraint:
st ≥ 0
The borrowing constraint implies that the household net worth at the beginning of a
period can be negative if the realization of health costs exceed savings10.
Following Hubbard et al. (1995), government transfers are parameterized as:
Tt = min
{
cmin, max{0, cmin − (At + Yt + ssbmt + ssbft )}
}
Transfer payments guarantee a minimum amount of resources for the household in
every period equal to cmin . The transfer function captures the penalty on saving behavior
that means-tested programmes such as Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or
food stamps impose on low-asset households.
10French and Jones (2007) argue this is a reasonable assumption in view of the number of HRS households
who report medical expense debt.
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4.3.5 Wage Process
The logarithm of wages if modeled as a function the number of hours worked, observable
state variables and a persistent error component:
lnwit = ςhit(dit) + Zitβ
j + υit (4.3.4)
υit = υit−1 + ζit
ζit ∼ iid
The parameter ς is intended to capture the wage penalty associated to working part
time. The estimation of the vector of coefficients β and the variance of the shocks to the
persistent component is carried out separately for men and women and described in detail
in section 4.5.2.
Involuntary unemployment is not considered, that is, in each period every individual
receives a wage offer given by 4.3.4. In this context, shocks to wages can be interpreted
as shocks to productivity.
4.3.6 Out of Pocket Medical Expenditures
Household i’s out-of-pocket medical expenditures, hcit, are modeled as a function of
spouses’ ages plus a random term ψit:
lnhcit = hc(agemit , age
f
it + ψit, (4.3.5)
ψ ∼ N(0, σ2ψ)
4.3.7 Social Security Benefits
The Social Security system provides disincentives to work past certain ages. The strength
of the incentives can be a function of household characteristics -such as as wealth or the
relative level of lifetime earnings between husband and wife-, as discussed below.
The level of Social Security benefits, ssbt, is determined from a worker’s lifetime earn-
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ings in several steps.11 First, annual earnings are indexed to account for changes in the
national average wage, and the 35 highest years of earnings are used to compute the av-
erage indexed monthly earnings (AIME). Appendix 3.B describes the computation of the
variable Et, which approximates AIME.
Second, a formula is applied to AIME to obtain the primary insurance amount (PIA).
This formula is weighed in favor of relatively low earners, so that the replacement rate
falls as the level of earnings rises.
Third, the PIA is adjusted according to the worker’s age when claiming benefits for
the first time. Individuals claiming at age 65 receive the full PIA. For every year between
ages 65 and 70 that benefit application is delayed, future benefits rise by the equivalent to
5.5% per year. This rate is less than actuarially fair, and therefore generates an incentive
to draw benefits by age 65. For every year before age 65 the individual applies for benefits,
these are reduced by 6.7%, which is roughly actuarially fair. Individuals are ineligible to
receive a Social Security pension before age 62. This gives individuals with low wealth an
incentive to remain in work until that age.
Once a worker has claimed benefits, these will be paid for life. Benefits are adjusted
every year for increases in the CPI.
Individuals who claim benefits and keep working are subject to the Social Security
earnings test. If the labor income of a beneficiary below age 65 exceeds a threshold level
of $7,440, benefits are taxed at a 50% rate. For beneficiaries aged between 66 and 70 who
earn more than $10,200, benefits are taxed at a 33% rate. For every year of benefits taxed
away, future benefits are increased by 6.7% for workers aged between 62 and 65 and by 4%
for those aged from 65 to 70. Again, this is far from actuarially fair, and hence a further
disincentive to work beyond age 65.
An important feature of the Social Security program is the structure of dependent
benefits. Spouses are entitled to a benefit equal to up to one half of their partner’s PIA
(reduced if either the worker or the spouse claims benefits before 65) if this is higher than
the benefit they would get based on their own record. The spousal benefit only becomes
11This section describes the Social Security rules that were in place in the year 1992. See the Annual
Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin for subsequent years for information on changes to
these rules.
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available once the spouse reaches age 62 and the worker has claimed benefits. The majority
of spousal benefit beneficiaries are women. The rule may give some men incentives to bring
forward their claiming date in order to provide their wife with a pension once she becomes
62, leading to correlations in spouses’ retirement decisions. Finally, widows or widowers
are entitled to a benefit equal to the deceased spouse’s PIA (reduced if either the worker
or the deceased spouse claimed benefits before age 65), whenever this is higher than the
benefit they would get based on their own record.
The formulae used to approximate Social Security benefits in the model, which take
into account the features of the system just outlined, are described in detail in appendix
3.B.
4.3.8 Survival Probabilities
Survival rates are a function of age and sex. In particular, the probability that an indi-
vidual who is alive in period t survives to period t+ 1 is:
sjt+1 = s(age
j , j), j ∈ {m,f}
4.3.9 Terminal Value Functions and Bequest Function
Upon death of one spouse, the behavior of the surviving partner is not modeled. Their re-
maining lifetime utility is represented by the terminal value functionsBf or Bm -depending
on whether the wife or the husband survives:
Bj(zt) = θj
(W jt )
α1(1−ρ)
(1− ρ) j = m, f,
where W is the present discounted value of retirement wealth for the surviving spouse,
computed as the sum of assets available upon the death of the spouse plus the present
discounted value of the surviving spouse’s Social Security benefit, which are equal to the
highest between their own benefits and those of the deceased partner:
W jt = At + PDVt(max(ssb
j
t , ssb
k
t )) j, k = m, f, and j 6= k
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If none of the spouses reaches period t alive, the household derives utility from assets
bequeathed to survivors, At. The bequest function has the following form:
Bb(At) = θb
(At +K)α1(1−ρ)
(1− ρ) ,
where K measures the curvature of the function. K = 0 implies an infinite disutility
of leaving non-positive bequests, while for K > 0 the utility of a zero bequest is finite.
4.4 Model Solution
The objective of the paper is to use the observed realizations of household choices and
states, {dt, st, zt}, to estimate the vector of unknown parameters θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3), which
includes preference parameters, θ1, and the parameters that determine the data generating
process for the state variables, (θ2, θ3).
It follows from the description in section 4.3 of the laws of motion for the state variables
that households’ beliefs about uncertain future states can be represented by a first-order
Markov probability density function. There is an extensive literature dealing with the
solution and estimation of stochastic Markov programs, but both the theoretical work and
subsequent applications focus on discrete decision processes.12 As the model described
in the previous sections features both discrete (participation status) and continuous (sav-
ings) decisions, below we show how the solution procedure for discrete Markov processes
introduced by Rust (1987, 1988) can be extended to account for the continuous control.
4.4.1 Optimization Problem
In order to solve the finite-horizon Markovian decision problem, households choose a se-
quence of decision rules Π = {pi0, pi1, ..., piT }, where pit(zt, εt) = (dt, st), to maximize ex-
pected discounted utility over the lifetime. The value function is defined as13:
12see Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Rust (1994), Miller (1997) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) for
surveys on the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models and Rust and Phelan (1997), Hotz and Miller
(1993), Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Gilleskie (1998) for applications with discrete choice sets.
13For ease of exposition, the survival probabilities of both spouses are set equal to 1 in the description
of the model solution.
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Vt(zt, εt, θ) = sup
Π
E

T∑
j=t
βj−t [U(dt, st, zt, εt, θ1)] | zt, εt, θ2, θ3
 , (4.4.1)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the controlled stochastic process {zt, εt},
with probability distribution given by:
f(zt+1, εt+1|zt, εt, dt, st, θ2, θ3) (4.4.2)
Since this is a finite horizon problem, the feasible set of household choices is compact,
and the utility function continuous, the value function Vt(zt, εt, θ1) defined in 4.4.1 always
exists and is the unique solution to the Bellman equation given by:
Vt(zt, εt, θ) = max
dt,st
[U(dt, st, zt, εt, θ1) + βEVt+1(zt+1, εt+1, dt, st, θ)] , (4.4.3)
where
EVt+1(zt+1, εt+1, dt, st, θ) =
∫
y
∫
η
Vt+1(y, η)f(dy, dη|zt, εt, dt, st, θ2, θ3) (4.4.4)
Solving for the optimal controls dt and st in 4.4.3 requires solving a highly-dimensional
problem. The presence of εt as a state variable adds 9 dimensions to the state space, and
since it enters nonlinearly the function EVt+1, 9-dimensional integrals need to be solved
to integrate it out. The following assumption, which is key in the framework developed
by Rust (1988) for the solution and estimation of discrete Markov processes, simplifies the
solution of the household problem considerably14:
Conditional Independence Assumption (CI): The conditional probability density func-
tion for the state variables factors as
f(zt+1, εt+1|zt, εt, dt, st, θ2, θ3) = q(εt+1|zt+1, θ2)g(zt+1|zt, dt, st, θ3)
CI implies two restrictions on the serial dependence of observable and unobservable
14The CI assumption has been widely used in the literature. See Rust (1994) and Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2010) for a review.
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states. First, zt+1 is a sufficient statistic for εt+1, which implies that any statistical depen-
dence between εt and εt+1 is transmitted entirely through the vector of observed states
zt+1. Second, the probability density of zt+1 depends only on zt and not on εt.
Next, we make an assumption on the functional form of the density of ε. In particular,
q(ε|z, θ2) is a multivariate extreme value distribution:
q(ε|z, θ2) =
∏
k∈D
exp{−ε(k) + θ2} exp{− exp{−ε(k) + θ2}},
where θ2 = γ = 0.577216 is Euler’s constant.
Under the CI assumption and the extreme value distribution assumption, the integral
EVt+1 with respect to εt+1 has a closed-form solution. This eliminates the need to evaluate
the 9-dimensional integrals numerically, and hence renders the problem computationally
tractable. In what follows we drop εt+1 from the conditioning set for EVt+1 to indicate
that it has been integrated out using the functional form restrictions.
Substituting for the specification of the utility function given in 4.3.1 we can now
re-write the Bellman equation as a two-stage problem:
Vt(zt, εt, θ) = max
dt
[
max
st
[u(k, st, zt, θ1) + βEVt+1(zt+1, k, st, θ)|dt = k] + εt(dt)
]
, (4.4.5)
where u(dt, st, zt, θ1) ≡ φ um(ct, lmt ) + (1 − φ)uf (ct, lft ). Proceeding backwards, the
solution for the optimal controls dt and st can be computed in two stages: first, optimal
savings are computed conditional on each discrete participation choice (inner maximiza-
tion). Second, the discrete option that yields the highest value given the draw of the
unobservable state is chosen by the household (outer maximization).
The solution of the inner maximization yields the vector of choice-specific value func-
tions r (zt, θ) ≡ {r(zt, k, θ) | k ∈ D}, where r(zt, k, θ) represents the indirect utility function
associated to the household participation status k:
r(zt, k, θ) = max
st
{[u(k, st, zt, θ1) + βEVt+1(zt+1, k, st, θ)] | dt = k} (4.4.6)
The outer maximization is a random utility model:
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max
dt
{r(zt, dt, θ) + εt(dt)} (4.4.7)
As discussed in Rust (1987), 4.4.7 differs from the static random utility model (Mc-
Fadden (1973, 1981)) through the addition of the term EVt+1(zt+1, k, st, θ) to the static
utility u(k, st, zt, θ1) in the choice-specific value functions (4.4.6). The presence of the
continuous control st adds a discrete-choice-specific maximization to Rust’s framework.
Under the assumption that ε follows an extreme value distribution, the conditional
choice probabilities are given by the multinomial logit formula:
P (k|zt, θ) = exp {r(zt, k, θ)}∑
k∈D
exp {r(zt, k, θ)} (4.4.8)
The parameters of the model are estimated by matching moments based on the choice-
specific probabilities in 4.4.8 simulated from the structural model to those observed in the
data.
4.5 Data and First Stage Results
4.5.1 Data
For the estimation of the model, I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
for the years 1992 to 2008. The HRS is a longitudinal data set representative of non-
institutionalized individuals over the age of 50 and their spouses. It provides extensive
information on economic status -including comprehensive measures of wealth, income from
work, private pensions, social security and other government transfers-; health; retirement;
and demographics.
The HRS survey data can be matched to Social Security Administration (SSA) data
for those respondents who gave permission to access their administrative records. I use the
restricted SSA administrative data to obtain the measure of accumulated earnings used
in the model, which serves to define the amount of social security pension accrued by an
individual at every point in time.
The HRS contains information on 11,114 couples. Of those, I drop 1,231 couples who
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either marry or divorce during the sample period and 640 couples where at least one spouse
receives social security disability insurance before age 6215. I also exclude the extremely
wealthy from the sample, dropping 102 couples with more than $1,250,000 in assets (1992
dollars).
The theoretical model presented in section 4.3 covers the main incentives for retirement
of couples who do not have defined benefit pensions. For the estimation I use only couples
where neither the husband nor the wife have a defined benefit pension. This reduces the
sample to 6,243 couples.
When working with couples, rather than individuals, the age difference between the
spouses becomes a crucial state variable. This is because couples where the husband is,
say, a year older than the wife, solve a different optimization problem -in particular, they
face a different intertemporal budget constraint- than couples where the husband is more
or less than a year older; younger; or the same age as his wife. In the data I observe
couples that are up to 30 years apart in age. In order to have a homogeneous sample,
in my analysis I select only those spouses who are at most 10 years apart in age. This
leaves a final sample of 5,633 couples and 32,448 couple-year observations. This sample
is used to estimate the participation profiles, retirement and joint retirement frequencies,
and asset profiles.
Due to computational limitations, I cannot solve and simulate the theoretical model
for the whole distribution of age differences used in the estimation of profiles, i.e. from -10
to +10 years. Hence, for the estimation of the preference parameters I limit the sample
to couples husband is from 0 to 5 years older than his wife. There are 3,595 such couples,
that is, 64% of couples in my final sample are included within this range of age differences.
Wages are computed as annual earnings divided by hours, and are dropped if wages are
less than $3 per hour or greater than $100 per hour in 1992 dollars. Individuals are defined
as working full time if they work more than 32 hours per week and as working part time
if they work between 6 and 32 hours per week. In the solution of the theoretical model,
individuals working full time are assigned the median number of weekly work hours for
15Modelling the processes of marriage formation, divorce, and disability benefit determination is beyond
the scope of this chapter. See Bergstrom (1997) and Weiss (1997) for a survey of the literature on household
formation and dissolution and Buchinsky et al. (1999) for a review of the social security disability award
process.
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full-time workers, which is 45 hours for men and 40 hours for women. Individuals working
part time are assigned the median number of weekly work hours for part-time workers,
which is 20 hours for both men and women.
4.5.2 Wage process
The model of retirement presented in section 4.3 allows for individuals to work full-time,
part-time and to be out of work at different points during their lifetime. No restriction
is imposed on individuals’ ability to go back to full-time work after spells of part-time
work or full-retirement. This is done in order to accommodate the behavior of a small
proportion of individuals who actually go back to work after retirement. However, the data
show a considerable amount of persistence in the retirement decision. Most individuals
who move into a part-time job never go back to full-time work; and most individuals who
stop working never go back to work.
When matching these transitional patterns, I find that in the absence of any cost asso-
ciated to switching from one work status to another, the model predicts that individuals
move in and out of the labor force more often than they actually do in the data. Matching
these transitions accurately, however, is crucial in the context of this chapter. In order
to determine which couples are retiring jointly we need a clean measure of the retirement
timing of each spouse, that is, the first period they are out of the labor force. This mea-
sure becomes very inaccurate if the simulated individuals keep switching in and out of the
labor force.
In reality there are likely to be costs associated to switching work status. An individual
who leaves her full-time job loses all the returns to tenure and firm-specific capital, and
is unlikely to receive a comparable wage offer if she decides to go back to full-time work
after a period of retirement or semi-retirement. I capture these costs in the model by
assuming that individuals who work part-time or do not work at all during a period suffer
a permanent wage depreciation. The different rates of wage depreciation associated to
part-time work and retirement will be estimated directly from the structural model.
Therefore, I proceed as follows to estimate the wage process parameters: first, I follow
the procedure outlined in chapter 3 to estimate the wage process of individuals working
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full-time. For the purposes of this chapter, the estimation is carried out pooling individuals
with no pension or a DC pension. Estimates of the selection equation for married men
aged 51 to 75 are reported in the first column of table 4.5 in appendix 3.E. Results for
women are presented in the second column of the same table.
The estimates of the selection processes are used to generate inverse Mills ratios for
each gender. These are included as regressors in the wage equation. Estimates for the
wage equation for men and women are reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 4.6 in appendix
3.E, respectively.
The residuals from the wage regressions are used to estimate the variance of the wage
shocks. Estimates for men and women are reported in table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Standard deviation of persistent component of wages.
Men Women
σ2ζ 0.016** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.001)
Finally, the rates of wage depreciation associated to part-time work and retirement are
estimated from the structural model, together with the preference parameters, in section
4.6.
4.5.3 Health Expenditures
Health costs are assumed to follow the process in equation (4.3.5). The function hc(.) is
approximated as a polynomial on individual age.
Estimates of the polynomial coefficients are used in the dynamic programme to predict
future health costs of sample individuals. In order to appropriately capture the evolution
of health cost risk as individuals age, the estimation sample must include observations of
health costs for individuals of all ages. However, individuals in the HRS cohort are rarely
observed beyond age 75. Core16 HRS individuals were aged 51 to 61 when interviewed
for the first time in 1992, and 63 to 73 in 2004, the last year of the panel. The only
way for an individual beyond age 75 to be present in the HRS cohort is if he or she is
married to a younger, age-eligible spouse. Hence, in order to obtain estimates that are
16I denote as core individuals those who belong to a cohort based on their year of birth, and not just
because they are married to an age-eligible spouse.
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also representative of older individuals, I combine data from the HRS cohort with data
from the AHEAD (Aging and Health Dynamics) cohort, which samples individuals born
before 1923 and their spouses.
As explained above, I have selected from the HRS cohort only those couples where
both spouses have either no private pension or a DC pension. I have no information on
private pension type for AHEAD individuals. So as to obtain a comparable sample, I
exclude AHEAD individuals who report to be receiving any private pension income. This
eliminates from the sample those AHEAD couples where one of the spouses is receiving
a DC pension. However, given the relatively recent expansion of this type of pensions,
the number of such couples is unlikely to be large. On the other hand, the sample would
include any AHEAD couple who were expecting to receive a DB pension in the future, but
were not doing so during the sample years. Again, since AHEAD individuals are observed
until they are aged 81 or over, this is unlikely to be a concern for a significant number of
observations.
There are several respects in which individuals from the HRS and AHEAD cohorts may
differ. An important one is pension coverage, which is more widespread in the younger
cohort, especially for women. This is partly related to another important difference across
cohorts: the accumulated work experience of younger women is noticeably higher than
that of their older counterparts.
In the estimation of equation (.), the presence of cohort effects is accounted for by
interacting all terms of the hc polynomial with cohort dummies. Time dummies are also
included in the regression, in order to account for differences in the way out-of-pocket
health costs are measured across waves.
Finally, I allow for changes in health costs after age 65, when all individuals become
entitled to the public health insurance programme Medicare, by adding to the regressions
a dummy indicating whether an individual is 65 years of age or older, and its interactions
with other variables of interest.
Results of the separate regressions for men and women are shown in table 4.7 in
appendix 3.E.
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4.5.4 Remaining Calibrations of Exogenous Parameters
Gender-specific health transition probabilities, conditional on health status on the previous
period, are calibrated to those observed in the data.
I take unconditional survival probabilities from the life table used by the US Social
Security Administration17 for the cohort born between 1930 and 1939 -the HRS sample
includes individuals born from 1931 to 1941 and their spouses-. Survival probabilities
conditional on health status are obtained applying Bayes’ rule, separately for men and
women.
prob(survivalt|Mt−1 = good) = prob(Mt−1 = good|survivalt)
prob(Mt−1 = good)
× prob(survivalt),
where all probabilities except for the unconditional survival probability are calibrated
from the data.
The means-tested consumption floor provided by transfers is set to $633 per household,
per month. This is the (means-tested) amount of Supplemental Social Security Income
that a couple aged 65 or older and on income support would have received in 1992.
4.6 Estimation of Preference Parameters
4.6.1 Initial Conditions
To generate the initial conditions I take random draws from the empirical joint distribution
of household assets, male and female wage fixed effects and lifetime earnings for couples
where the husband is 55 to 60 years old and the wife is 0 to 5 years younger than the
husband.
4.6.2 Parameter Estimates
I first estimate a version of the model where the parameters measuring the leisure comple-
mentarities (αm2 and α
f
2) are restricted to being equal to 0. Results from this estimation
17“Life Tables for the United States Social Security Area 1900-2100”. Social Security Administration.
Office of the Chief Actuary. August 2005.
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are presented in column 1 of table 4.2. The results indicate that the share of consump-
tion in the husband’s utility function, αm1 , is considerably larger than in the wife’s utility
function (αf1).
Regarding the wage process parameters, the results indicate that husbands’ and the
wives’ wages depreciate by almost 10% and 11%, respectively, per year working part-
time. Their wages depreciate by around 20 and 22 percentage points per year spent out
of work. These depreciation costs explain why most people who start working part time
don’t go back into full time work, and most people who stop working don’t go back into
work. Notice that the depreciation associated with part-time work for elderly individuals
need not be as high for younger individuals, as for the former the switch from full-time
into part-time work usually implies a move from their career job into a bridge job and
semi-retirement.
Table 4.2: Preference and Wage Process Parameter Estimates
Specification
Parameter and definition (1) (2)
αm1 Consumption share, male U function 0.5102 0.5274
(0.0061)
αf1 Consumption share, female U function 0.4295 0.4334
(0.0043)
α2 Value of shared retirement 0.0891
(0.0079)
δmPT Male’s wage depreciation per year working PT 0.9051 0.9258
(0.0383)
δfPT Female’s wage depreciation per year working PT 0.8933 0.9219
(0.0334)
δmR Male’s wage depreciation per year of retirement 0.8092 0.8609
(0.0436)
δfR Female’s wage depreciation per year of retirement 0.7795 0.7841
(0.0336)
Value GMM criterion 0.2058 0.1404
Next, I estimate a version of the model where no restriction is imposed on the leisure
complementarity parameter. Results for this estimation are presented in column 2 of table
4.2. The first noticeable point regards the differences in estimates for the parameters
that are common to the previous specification. In particular, the consumption shares in
both spouses’s utility functions are larger, and the wage depreciation rates smaller, in
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the presence of leisure complementarities. This suggest that, in the restricted model, the
timing of those retirement that are induced by leisure complementarities was attributed
to spouses’ higher taste for leisure relative to consumption and a higher cost of re-entry
into the labor force after retirement.
The parameter measuring leisure complementarity is positive and significant. The
estimated value of 0.891 implies that each spouse gets an extra amount of leisure equal
to 9% of the leisure endowment, or 360 extra hours per year, by sharing retirement with
their partner.
Figure 4.1 shows the simulated versus the true profiles for the moments I match in the
estimation process. Overall, the simulated profiles appear consistent with the data. The
two graphs on the top row show that the model predicts very closely total male and female
participation. The graphs on the second row of Figure 4.1 compare the simulated rates
of full-time and part-time participation for men and women with the actual ones. The
model predicts these rates quite closely for men, although it substantially underpredicts
part-time participation for women. This could be due to two things: the number of hours
worked when employed part- and full-time has been set equal to the median hours worked
by part- and full-time workers, respectively, for men and women. There may exist a fixed
cost of work for women that does not exist (or is lower) for men. Adding this cost as a
fixed number of extra hours lost when working for women would likely decrease the rate of
full-time and increase the rate of part-time participation for women, increasing the overall
fit. Another possibility is that the part-time wage premium, which has been set equal
to 25% for both men and women is actually lower for women. A lower part-time wage
premium would also lead women to choose to work part-time more frequently.
The graph on the left of the third row of figure 4.1 shows the retirement age distribution
for men between ages 55 and 69. The graph on the right is the equivalent for women. The
model captures the spikes at ages 62 and 65 for both men and women, but it substantially
overpredicts retirements for both sexes at age 65. One possible reason for this is that
the estimated version of the model does not account for the role of health. If bad health
increases the cost of work, it can lead to earlier retirements for some individuals.
Finally, the graph on the last row of figure 4.1 shows the distribution of differences
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in retirement dates between husbands and wives. The bar at the center of the histogram
measures the proportion of couples where the husband retires within a year of his wife,
i.e. the joint retirements. The model does a good job of predicting the proportion of
joint retirements. However, it underpredicts the proportion of couples where the husband
retires at an earlier date than the wife, while it overpredicts that of couples where the wife
is the first to retire.
4.6.3 The Role of Complementarities
To offer a sense of the importance of complementarities in determining joint retirements, I
experiment with the following changes to the model. First, I restrict the complementarity
parameter to being equal to 0. Results from this experiment are shown on the third series
in figure 4.2. Taking away the extra value that spouses get from sharing their retirement
decreases predicted joint retirements by 3.77 percentage points. Next, I change the social
security function and eliminate the spousal benefit, which gives the spouse with the lower
lifetime earnings (usually the wife) the right to supplement her pension until her benefits
are equal to up to a half those of her husband. In this case, the predicted percentage of
joint retirements decreases by a further 5.42 percentage points.
These experiments suggest that, while leisure complementarities play an important
role in leading spouses to retire together, the effect of the social security spousal benefit
leads to an even larger share of joint retirement.
Another point worth mentioning in relation to figure 4.2 is that both eliminating the
leisure complementarities and the spousal benefit leads to an increase in the proportion of
couples where the husband retires earlier than the wife. This suggests that both incentives
for joint retirement act by either anticipating the retirement of the wives or delaying the
retirement of the husbands.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I present a stochastic dynamic model of older couples’ participation and
savings decisions.
The model accounts in a detailed way for the main financial incentives and sources of
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Figure 4.1: Simulated Profiles vs. True Profiles.
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Figure 4.2: Joint Retirement Frequencies. Data, Simulation, and Experiments.
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uncertainty for couples approaching retirement. Couples are heterogeneous in household
wealth, wages and lifetime earnings. They face uncertainty in wage income, survival, and
out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
The model allows for interactions in spouses’ leisure. In particular, spouses may enjoy
retirement more (complementarity) or less (substitutability) when their partner is retired
too.
Estimation results show evidence of leisure complementarities. When both partners are
retired, each one enjoys an extra amount of leisure equal to 9% of the leisure endowment,
or 360 hours per year.
The model shows the importance of accurately accounting for incentives to joint re-
tirement acting through the budget constraint in order to accurately estimate the role
of complementarities. The social security dependent spouse benefit alone is responsible
for almost twice as many joint retirements as the existence of leisure complementarities.
These retirements would likely be attributed to complementarities in a framework where
the role of social security was not appropriately modeled.
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4.8 Appendix 3.A. Mathematical Appendix
Computation of the integral with respect to out-of-pocket medical expendi-
tures.
In order to solve period t’s problem, we need an approximation to the expected value
of Vt+1. This expected value is taken with respect to health status in t + 1, survival into
t+1, health costs in period t18 and, when the husband is younger than 75 and/or the wife
younger than 70, wages in period t+1. In this section I describe the steps involved in the
computation of the expected value with respect to health costs.
Ehcm,hcf V̂t+1(zt+1, xt+1 | zt, xt) (4.8.1)
Recall that the probability that health costs are positive, and the logarithm of health
costs have been modeled as follows:
p(hcit > 0) = p1it = Xitβ1 + ψ
1
it
lnhcit = Xitβ2 + ψ2it,
ψ2it ∼ N(0, σ2ψ2)
Hence the positive health costs are lognormally distributed:
hcit | Xit ∼ logN(Xitβ̂2, σ̂2ψ2)
Omitting the conditioning on the state variables that are not relevant to the solution
of this integral, (A1) can be re-written as follows:
18It is assumed that the realisation of the medical cost draw happens at the end of the period, after
households have made their consumption and work decisions.
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Ehcm,hcf V̂t+1(zt+1, xt+1 | zt, xt) =
+ (1− p1,mit )× (1− p1,fit )× V̂t+1(hcmit = 0, hcfit = 0)+
+ (1− p1,mit )× p1,fit ×
∫ ∞
0
V̂t+1(hcmit = 0, hc
f
it)f(hc
f
it | Xit)dhcf+
+ p1,mit × (1− p1,fit )×
∫ ∞
0
V̂t+1(hcmit , hc
f
it = 0)f(hc
m
it | Xit)dhcm+
+ p1,mit × p1,fit ×
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
V̂t+1(hcmit , hc
f
it)f(hc
m
it | Xit)f(hcfit | Xit)dhcmdhcf .
Below I describe in detail the computation of the integral with respect to the husband’s
health costs. The value of the integral with respect to the wife’s health costs is computed
in a symmetric way, while the double integral is solved using a two-dimensional Gauss-
Hermite integration rule.
Define K as:
K ≡
∫ +∞
0
V̂t+1(hcmit )f(hc
m
it | Xit)dhcm
Since hcmit is lognormally distributed,
K =
∫ +∞
0
V̂t+1(hcmt )
1
hcmit σ̂
m
ψ2
(2pi)1/2
exp
−
(
lnhcmt −Xitβ̂m2
21/2σ̂m
ψ2
)2 dhcm
Using the following change of variable,
zit =
lnhcmit −Xitβ̂m2
21/2σ̂m
ψ2
,
yields
K ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
V̂t+1
(
exp{2 12 σ̂mψ2zit +Xitβ̂2m}
) 1
pi1/2
exp
{−z2it} dz1
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The value of K is approximated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
K ≈ 1
pi1/2
P∑
j=1
V̂t+1
(
exp{21/2σ̂mψ2ξj +Xitβ̂2m}
)
ωj ,
where {ξj , ωj}Pj=1 are the abscissae and weights of a one-dimensional Gauss-Hermite
integration rule with P points, which can be found in standard references (e.g. Abramowitz
and Stegun, 1964).
4.9 Appendix 3.B. Social Security function
Individual benefits
Benefits depend on indexed lifetime earnings. For each year of work, there is a max-
imum amount of earnings, from which payroll tax is deducted, which will contribute to
the pension. Et is the measure of lifetime earnings used in the model:
Et ≡

∑t
j=0 ωje
∗
j if t ≤ R∑R
j=0 ωje
∗
j if t > R
,
where t = 0 is the first year of earnings, R is the first year of receipt of Social Security
benefits (subject to the restriction R ≥ 62), ω is the weight used by the Social Security
administration to index yearly earning, and e∗t is defined as the minimum between yearly
earnings et = wt × ht and maximum taxable earnings for that year, emaxt :
e∗t = min {et, emaxt } .
In order to avoid the need to keep track of every individual’s whole earnings history,
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIMEt) are approximated as a function of Et as
follows:
AIMEt =
Et
12×max{(t− 25), 35}
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Full retirement entitlement, also known as Primary Insurance Amount (PIAt) is ob-
tained from AIME according to the Social Security formula, re-scaled by the weight κ :
PIAt = κt [0.90×min{AIMEt, b0}+ 0.32×min{max{AIMEt − b0, 0}, b1 − b0}+
+0.15×max{AIMEt − b1, 0}] ,
where κt is calibrated to give an individual retiring at each possible age with the
maximum possible accumulated earnings exactly the same pension she would have been
awarded under the 1992 Social Security rules19. The bendpoints for the year 1992 are
b0 = $387 and b1 = $2, 333.
Benefit entitlement is determined as a function of the PIA in the period in which an
individual claims benefits, PIAR:
ssbt = f(PIAR, aget, wtht),
where f accounts for the actuarial adjustments for individuals who claim benefits
before or after age 65, and the earnings test.
Benefits lost through the earnings test translate into increases in future benefits. This
is captured in the model through increases in the value of PIAR.
Spouses and Widowed individuals
In periods when both spouses are claiming benefits, the spouse with lowest PIA re-
ceives benefits ssbt equal to the highest amount between her individual entitlement and
entitlement based on 50% of her partners’ PIA.
Individuals who become widowed can claim benefits based on their individual entitle-
ment or that of their deceased partner.
19The Social Security benefit approximation just described yields a very accurate fit for individuals with
the highest possible pensions. Consequently, the highest weight used in the model is equal to 1.0517, and
the lowest to 0.9915.
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4.10 Appendix 3.C. Taxes
This section describes the tax function applied to couples’ income in the model. House-
holds pay federal and payroll taxes on income. Due to the great cross-sectional variation in
state taxes, those are not accounted for here. I used the rates applying to married couples
filing jointly. Also, I use the standard deduction, and hence do not allow households to
defer medical expenses as an itemized deduction. The tax rates and exempt amounts used
below are those corresponding to the year 1992.
Payroll Tax
The payroll tax is a proportional tax imposed on employees, which is used to finance
the Social Security’s OASDI programme and Medicare’s hospital insurance programme.
The social security tax rate for employees is 6.2% of earnings up to an upper limit of
$55,500. The Medicare tax rate for employees is 1.45% of earnings, and it is uncapped.
Defining individual annual earned income as
eit ≡ wit × hit, for i = m, f,
each spouses’ payroll tax contribution is given by:
τP eit = (0.062)×min{$55, 500, eit}+ 0.0145× eit, for i = m, f
Federal Income Tax
The income tax is a progressive tax on labor and nonlabor income. The standard
deduction for a married couple filing jointly was $6,000 in 1992. Additionally, each spouse
was entitled to a further deduction of $700 if aged 65 or over.
Defining household income subject to federal income tax as
It ≡ (1− τP )emt + (1− τP )eft + rAt,
generates the following level of post-income tax for a couple where both spouses are
below age 65:
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Table 4.3: Federal Income Tax Structure
Taxable income (I) Post-tax Income Marginal
(in dollars) (in dollars) rate
0− 6, 000 Y 0.00
6, 000− 41, 800 6,000 + 0.85(Y-6,000) 0.15
41, 800− 92, 500 36,430 + 0.72(Y-41,800) 0.28
92, 500 and over 72,934 + 0.69(Y-92,500) 0.31
Denoting the federal income tax structure by the vector τ I , households’ post-tax in-
come is given by:
Y (rAt, emt , e
f
t , τ
P , τ I) = (1− τ I)It
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4.11 Appendix 3.D. Figures
Figure 4.3: Retirement frequencies for married men and women at ages 51 to 70.
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Retirement frequency at age j defined as the proportion of all retirements observed between ages 51 and 70 that takes place at
age j.
Figure 4.4: Differences in spouses’ retirement dates as a function of age difference between them.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of actual and assumed Social Security claiming date. Men.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of actual and assumed Social Security claiming date. Women.
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Figure 4.7: Retirement frequencies by pension type. Men.
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Figure 4.8: Retirement frequencies by pension type. Women.
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4.12 Appendix 3.E. Tables
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics by pension type.
Men Women
None DC only DB only None DC only DB only
Percentage population 1 39.59 27.24 14.34 52.23 18.39 12.08
Employment
% working at age 61 76.89 60.70 77.68 44.27 56.83 62.58
Average log wage in 1992 dollars 2 2.29 2.56 2.56 1.98 2.39 2.28
(0.84) (0.62) (0.66) (0.71) (0.59) (0.47)
Health insurance
% with retiree health coverage 3 10.67 32.25 27.22 7.13 31.75 19.43
% with tied health coverage 3 5.83 11.87 20.56 5.12 16.74 17.88
% with no empl. health insurance 3 51.23 22.39 27.78 66.92 33.91 44.59
Median health costs per period 293.34 301.17 304.03 417.23 416.52 365.96
Average health costs per period 961.11 876.20 777.21 1,202.55 1,065.71 919.15
(3,883) (2,706) (1,816) (4,502) (3,415) (2,404)
Health Status
% in bad health 25.67 19.48 17.74 23.59 16.00 12.96
Total wealth in 1992 dollars 4
Median 113,000 127,500 127,000 110,000 148,000 142,750
25th percentile 41,000 65,550 63,648 44,000 75,500 72,925
Financial wealth in 1992 dollars 5
Median 50,000 60,450 71,000 48,200 82,000 82,575
25th percentile 8,200 19,000 19,200 9,800 24,400 25,000
Demographics
Average age 62.81 62.73 61.68 58.36 58.51 57.68
% College education 35.30 36.04 41.30 27.54 46.06 38.59
% High-School graduates 33.32 40.97 36.02 42.84 40.46 47.09
N (couple-year observations) 10,031 6,903 3,634 13,234 4,661 3,060
NOTE. - 1 Percentages do not sum to 100 because of individuals for whom it is not possible to derive pension type. 2 For
participating individuals only. 3 Percentage measured with respect of individuals who report type of health insurance. Due
to concerns about the measurement of health insurance type in the first two waves, reported figures correspond to wave 3.
4 Wealth measure includes housing but excludes private pension holdings. 5Includes value of checking and saving accounts,
stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts, CD’s, Government bonds, Treasury bills and all other savings minus the value of debts
such as credit card balances, life insurance policy loans or loans from relatives. It does not include housing wealth or private
pension holdings.
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Table 4.5: Estimates of selection equation for married men and women.
Men Women
agert/10 -0.453 0.052
(0.543) (0.677)
age2rt/100 -0.035 -0.080
(0.045) (0.059)
d62rt -0.309** -0.231**
(0.043) (0.053)
d65rt -0.258** -0.135
(0.053) (0.074)
bad hrt -0.206** -0.157**
(0.047) (0.056)
wealthrt $(0000) -0.004** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
d62st -0.127** -0.014
(0.038) (0.034)
DBst 0.003 -0.103*
(0.040) (0.042)
edu1r -0.219** 0.189**
(0.038) (0.042)
edu1r× DCr 0.574** 0.661**
(0.048) (0.052)
edu2r -0.120** -0.082*
(0.036) (0.039)
edu2r× DCr 0.498** 0.878**
(0.049) (0.047)
ager 0.972 1.875**
(0.513) (0.457)
age2r -0.080* -0.135**
(0.041) (0.039)
bad hr -0.434** -0.325**
(0.062) (0.072)
wealthr ($0000) 0.000 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
mother educr 0.027* -0.045**
(0.012) (0.014)
constant 1.369 -4.422*
(1.844) (1.907)
N 17,139 18,312
NOTE. - Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates the coefficient is significant at
5%. ** indicates significance at 1%. Both regressions include year and cohort dummies and a
measure of the unemployment rate at period t for men/women aged 55 and older in order to
control for economy-wide effects. Dummies of the form dagej are equal to 1 if the individual
is older than agej . Dummies of the form dage
sp
j are equal to 1 if the spouse is older than
agej . The dummy bad h is equal to 1 if the individual is in fair or poor health. The dummies
redu1 and redu2 indicate whether the individual has at least some college or is a high school
graduate, respectively.
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Table 4.6: Estimates of wage equation for married men and women.
Dependent variable: lnwrt
Men Women
ageit 2.234** 1.435*
(0.560) (0.642)
age2it/100 -0.216** -0.136*
(0.053) (0.064)
bad hit -0.061* -0.049
(0.028) (0.032)
edu1i 0.222** 0.438**
(0.037) (0.050)
edu1it× DC 0.303** 0.212*
(0.059) (0.097)
edu2i 0.075* 0.093*
(0.034) (0.044)
edu2it× DC 0.200** 0.348**
(0.056) (0.116)
ageit 0.009 -0.213
(0.377) (0.415)
age2it/100 -0.010 0.009
(0.030) (0.034)
bad hit -0.313** -0.231**
(0.050) (0.063)
wealthit 0.003** 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001)
mother educr 0.060** 0.001
(0.011) (0.014)
λ̂0it 0.401** 0.347*
(0.105) (0.172)
λ̂DCit 0.107** 0.108**
(0.040) (0.037)
constant -3.490 -1.410
(1.796) (2.208)
N 6,218 3,663
R2 0.273 0.378
NOTE. - Standard errors (in parenthesis) obtained from 2,500 bootstrap replications, account-
ing for estimation of inverse Mills ratios in first stage. * indicates the coefficient is significant
at 5%. ** indicates significance at 1%. The regressions include year and cohort dummies and
a measure of the unemployment rate at period t for men/women aged 55 and older in order to
control for economy-wide effects. Dummies of the form dagej are equal to 1 if the individual
is older than agej . The dummy bad h is equal to 1 if the individual is in fair or poor health.
The dummies redu1 and redu2 indicate whether the individual has at least some college or is
a high school graduate, respectively.
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Table 4.7: Estimates of parameters from health cost process.
pr(hct > 100) Dependent variable: lnhct
ageht/10 -1.341 0.935*
(0.809) (0.458)
age2ht/100 0.099 -0.068
(0.062) (0.035)
agewt/10 1.383** 0.363*
(0.199) (0.157)
age2wt/100 -0.102** -0.021
(0.017) (0.013)
bad hht -0.023 0.216**
(0.043) (0.025)
bad hwt -0.080 0.276**
(0.046) (0.028)
w2 -0.145* 0.003
(0.074) (0.046)
w3 0.254** 0.422**
(0.078) (0.046)
w4 0.091 0.283**
(0.076) (0.044)
w5 0.067 0.402**
(0.079) (0.045)
w6 0.174* 0.633**
(0.085) (0.047)
w7 0.248** 0.738**
(0.090) (0.050)
w8 0.360** 0.613**
(0.100) (0.052)
c1 -0.535** -0.361**
(0.087) (0.055)
c2 0.061 -0.115*
(0.091) (0.046)
c4 0.039 -0.068
(0.070) (0.037)
c5 -0.014 -0.038
(0.130) (0.064)
constant 1.438 2.538
(2.554) (1.413)
σψ 1.086
(0.07302)
N 13,609 12,776
NOTE. - Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard error for the estimate
of σψ obtained from 2,500 bootstrap replications. * indicates the coefficient is
significant at 5%. ** indicates significance at 1%.
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